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ON THE ROAD TO ECONOMIC STABILIZATION¹

BY GERHARD COLM

WHEN the President signed the Employment Act on February 20, 1946, he made the following statement: "The Employment Act of 1946 is not the end of the road but rather the beginning. It is a commitment by the government to the people—a commitment to take any and all of the measures necessary for a healthy economy, one that provides opportunities for those able, willing and seeking to work. We shall all try to honor that commitment."

Today, more than two years later, we are still at the beginning of the road. There have been opportunities for those able, willing and seeking to work; there has indeed been full employment. It would, however, be stretching the point too far to attribute the full employment of these years to government policies under the Employment Act.

True, we have built the vehicles in which to travel toward economic stabilization. A Council of Economic Advisers has been established in the Executive Office of the President, and a Joint Committee on the Economic Report in Congress. These vehicles have made their first trial runs and, by skilful driving and luck, have avoided major collisions. The trial runs were not unsuccessful, but the real tests are still to come.

Equally as important as the construction of these vehicles is the fact that some progress has been made in exploring the nature of the road they will have to travel. The Employment Act consisted mainly of a policy declaration and the establishment of the two coordinating agencies. It prescribed their functions in a general way but gave no indication of the policies that should be followed.

¹ This article is based on a speech delivered at George Washington University, Washington, D. C., February 20, 1948, on the second anniversary of the signing of the Employment Act of 1946.

In this respect it was the beginning of a journey into uncharted land, and there was considerable controversy over whether the journey would lead to plenty and freedom or to ruin and serfdom.

At the time of the debate on the "Full Employment Bill" there were those who believed that without a well-coordinated economic policy the country would inevitably run again into a depression with mass unemployment and mass frustration. Our free democratic institutions might not survive another experience of that sort. There were, on the other hand, those who said that economic stabilization would not be desirable because it would lead to economic stagnation or to regimentation. Some believed that, even if desirable, it would not be feasible because neither the necessary technical and statistical knowledge nor the essential policy devices are available.

It is the intention of this paper to re-examine these main economic arguments² in the light of the experience of the last two years. This may at least help to reformulate the crucial questions and to identify some of the fields in which intensive work needs to be done by the economic profession to provide the answers indispensable to the success of this great venture.

Economic Progress and Economic Stabilization

Opponents of the philosophy of the full employment bill who insisted that a policy of economic stabilization would lead to economic stagnation asserted that depressions are the price we pay for progress. Economic progress inevitably leads to maladjustments, and depressions are the means of correcting maladjustments in a nonregulated economy.

An examination of this problem should pose two distinct questions: first, does economic progress necessarily lead to distortions in economic relationships; and second, do such distortions necessarily lead to depressions?

² A convenient summary of the objections can be found in the Report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate Report No. 583, 79th Congress, 1st Session, September 1945, *Assuring Full Employment in a Free Competitive Economy*.

The experience of the last two years seems to suggest an affirmative answer to the first question. There has been remarkable economic progress, but there have also developed serious distortions in the structure of production and the distribution of purchasing power. The Economic Reports of the President point out several of these maladjustments. The postwar reconversion, modernization, and expansion of the industrial plant and equipment and the demands of international reconstruction required such large amounts for domestic and international investments that consumption increased by a much smaller ratio as compared, for instance, with the prewar year 1939.³ The Economic Report states that the rate of consumer expenditures must increase at some future time when domestic investments and net exports begin to decline in order to prevent a depression. (The possibility of a considerable increase in government expenditures for defense is not discussed.)

By calling this extraordinary increase in domestic and foreign investments a distortion or maladjustment, it is not suggested that these outlays should have been curtailed. As a matter of fact, this increase was highly desirable. Incomes had been lifted through the war effort, particularly in the lower brackets,⁴ but our productive plant and equipment were not adequate to meet the peacetime demand engendered by incomes of such size and distribution as those with which we emerged from the war. These deficiencies in our production plant became apparent as soon as consumer spending and business outlays were released from wartime restrictions and restraints. Making up for the deficiencies and contributing to international reconstruction were therefore tasks of high economic priority after the end of the war.

It would have been folly to curb those urgent outlays in order to establish an ideal ratio between investments and consumption

³ "In terms of 1947 prices, annual expenditures for producers' durable equipment have increased by 170 percent, while annual consumers' expenditures have increased by only 48 percent above the prewar level" (*Economic Report of the President*, January 1948, p. 78). See also *ibid.*, p. 55, table.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18 and Appendix A IV.

that could be sustained over a longer period. In saying this we have no thought of condoning a policy that failed to deal effectively with inflationary developments in the postwar years. We do say, however, that a drastic curtailment of investments or net exports would have done more harm than good. But the investment boom brought about a relationship between investment and consumption that cannot be sustained and requires future adjustments. An increase in consumption, of both an absolute and relative nature, at a time when investments begin to decline will be a major task for price and wage policy, and for tax and other fiscal policies.

The postwar investment boom was certainly the result of a very specific situation, occurring as it did after a period of rising incomes, on the one hand, and of underinvestment during depression and war, on the other. Under more normal conditions, it will be necessary to make a real effort to reduce the fluctuations in business expansion.⁵ But such efforts will at best only reduce; they cannot eliminate swings in business investments. This is certainly true when investments are left to the free decisions of business management. It seems also to be true in countries with partial investment controls. One could cite as an example the recent British debate on the need to cut the amount of capital expenditures in relation to the portion of national resources devoted to exports and domestic consumption.⁶ Even in a fully controlled economy like that of the Soviet Union the relative emphasis on investments and consumption has been changed repeatedly. These observations refer, of course, to extraordinary situations. Yet there will always be some peculiar reason why

⁵ "If the swings from expansion to contraction of private business which we have had in the past were to continue, offsetting operations would be too big to be left to 'compensatory' Government policies. Economic stabilization can be achieved within our private enterprise system only if management accepts the responsibility for a more stable practice in planning its investment and operative programs" (Council of Economic Advisers, *Second Annual Report to the President*, December 1947, p. 18).

⁶ Cmd. 7268, *Capital Investment in 1948*, presented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, London 1947.

progress is made in uneven fashion. It would not be realistic, therefore, to assume for policy purposes that the economy of the industrial society will so expand that each component part grows exactly in that proportion that can be permanently sustained. It is safer to assume that the various parts move ahead unevenly, thus making periodic adjustments necessary.

In the past, maladjustments that developed during the upswing have resulted in depressions which created further maladjustment in the process. If economic stabilization attempted only to counteract unemployment, without adjustments, it would merely perpetuate the maladjustments. The real problem is to make the needed adjustments without permitting them to degenerate into depressions and mass unemployment. Thus the task of effective economic stabilization requires that we recognize what adjustments are needed and that we develop policy devices to effect such adjustments and to counteract depression tendencies that might evolve in the process.

Stating the problem of economic stabilization in this way does not answer the question whether or not we will be able to achieve it. But a more accurate identification of the task is useful for appraising the tools of economic analysis and the economic policy devices that will be needed to accomplish it.

Stabilization Policies

Those who objected to a policy of full employment on the grounds that it would lead to economic regimentation held that continuously maintaining ample markets and plenty of jobs would result in a constant upward pressure on prices and wages, and would necessitate price and wage controls.

During the past two years, it is true, we have had full employment and we have had inflationary pressure. Of course, we have also had more than adequate purchasing power to support "maximum employment and production" in the meaning of the Employment Act. But granting this, there still remains the possibility that a successful policy of sustained purchasing power for a high

level of employment and production may result in continued inflationary pressure. The experience of the past suggests the validity of this conclusion, and yet there are factors that point toward a possible solution.

There is, first of all, the fact that in several lines of business long-run considerations and possibly also the pressure of public opinion have induced management to charge prices below what the traffic would bear.⁷ It is also encouraging that labor has become price-conscious. There have been significant voices in the labor camp acknowledging that wage increases which engender price increases are not of much value for labor as a whole. But naturally labor cannot be persuaded to forgo wage demands unless it has reason to assume that there will be no general price rise.

In the light of the experience of the postwar years, there is the urgent need and the opportunity to explore some new patterns of price and wage policy. I believe that there is an alternative to permanent price and wage controls—that is, collective bargaining on the national level. It has been proposed that national top organizations of labor and management meet at least once a year to work out an agreement on general changes in wage rates that appear desirable and feasible for the coming year. This agreement would be predicated on price assumptions. If the price assumptions should prove invalid, the wage agreement would have to be reconsidered. The national wage agreement would serve for general guidance of management-labor negotiations in the various industries and regions. There are of course many contingent problems that require exploration, such as the role of government in national collective bargaining, the question of the relationship among various competing organizations of management and of labor, the degree of discipline within each organization necessary

⁷ In some industries prices are held at a level that yields ample profits from operations in existing plants, but below the level that would permit profitable operation in newly constructed plants. In these cases the relatively low price aids in protecting the quasi-monopolistic position of existing plants. This is not to suggest that the protection of a monopolistic position is the prime motive for keeping prices relatively low, but it may be a secondary consideration in some important industries.

for making such a system effective, and the degree of leeway that could be left to individual bargaining without impairing the purposes of the proposal.

Such a proposal would certainly require a modified stand on the part of management as well as labor. It must be recognized that some new approach is needed in order to accomplish the purposes of economic stabilization with a minimum of government regulation.

Critics of the full employment bill who stated during the debates that a full employment policy is not feasible because of a lack of suitable policy devices feared that the only device that could be used is government spending. Some of them regarded the whole measure simply as a concealed spending bill. It is true that the policy devices available for preventing threatening unemployment have not yet been tested under the Act, since the Act has been in effect only during a period of inflation. Nevertheless the experience of the postwar inflation does shed some light on this question.

Few economists would have expected a powerful inflationary pressure during a period of a substantial cash surplus in government budgets. Neither the wartime nor the postwar inflation could be effectively controlled by fiscal measures alone. Of course, sufficiently drastic fiscal measures could cope with any amount of inflation or deflation, but the "cure" might conceivably be as bad as the disease. It was apparent that only a combination of various devices could accomplish the objective of stabilization in a more desirable fashion.

It is certainly not by chance that in the President's Economic Report and in the Council's Report to the President the concept of "adjustments" plays an important role. This reflects, in the first place, a concern with "corrective" actions and only in the second place with "compensating" policies. This does not mean, of course, that fiscal compensatory policy is neglected. High taxes and a budget surplus play an important role in the anti-inflation

program; tax reduction and speeding up of long-delayed government programs undoubtedly will play an important role in a future program to combat a threatening or actual depression. But compensating the deflationary effects of a maladjustment is not enough. If that is the only policy adopted it may even tend to perpetuate the maladjustment.

Fiscal policy, in some circumstances, may be more than a compensating device; it may be the most effective way of bringing about the needed adjustment. This is the case, for instance, when an increase in consumption is needed and a reduction in the taxes that impede consumption is feasible. In other cases the adjustment may be needed in business investment policies, in wage policies, price policies, credit policies, international policies, or in any one or a combination of other fields. Thus all kinds of economic policies may become stabilization devices, depending on the circumstances. Fiscal policies play a particular role because they are more adaptable than many other policies. They are, however, by no means the only or the ultimate instrument in the tool chest of stabilization policies.

Economic Stabilization and Economic Analysis

The most frequently voiced objection to the full employment bill was that we cannot have an effective policy of stabilization unless we are able to predict economic events. This argument was raised particularly with respect to the specific formulation in the original bill that required a detailed forecast of the whole nation's economic budget—a formulation criticized from within and without the Administration. The Employment Act in its final version uses more noncommittal language; it requires the appraisal of "current and foreseeable economic trends," which is less difficult because what cannot be predicted is not foreseeable, and what is foreseeable need not be predicted.

Looking back again over the experience of the past two years, we find that economists inside and outside the government, as well as businessmen, have repeatedly been wrong in their economic pre-

dictions. Obviously we need to improve our statistical tools for making economic diagnoses. There are, however, two theoretical aspects of the problem that also require attention.

The first of these considerations concerns the fact that recent economic predictions have been based largely on the so-called national income "gap" analysis. In such an analysis, expected "primary" changes in such factors as business investments, foreign purchases, government budgets, consumer backlogs, and the like, are first determined. These estimates of "primary" changes then offer a basis for estimating secondary or induced changes in consumer incomes and expenditures and in the other categories of the nation's economic budget. This approach, with appropriate refinements, permits an estimate of expected changes in aggregate demand which can then be compared with the expected changes in the potential supply of goods and services. If expected aggregate demand, in present prices, appears to be larger than potential supply, inflationary pressure is assumed to exist. The size of the "gap" is believed to permit conclusions with regard to the expected price rise. In the absence of such a gap no price rise is expected.

We have learned, however, that even if prospective aggregate demand is in approximate equilibrium with potential supply we may still encounter an inflationary development. Because of specific scarcities, certain prices may rise and wage increases may follow or take place independently. Such an inflationary spiral is possible, of course, only if and as long as business can obtain funds for the additional working capital needed to carry inventories at higher prices. The price spiral in itself may then influence demand in a manner that could not be predicted by merely reviewing the various demand factors.

In the past, the economists who have used the aggregate approach, those who have studied particular price, wage, and cost movements, and those who have relied on the monetary explanation of the price level, have proceeded independently and critically of each other. The experience of the recent inflationary period

suggests that these three basic types of analysis must be integrated into a comprehensive approach to the problem of price determination.

The second theoretical consideration is the difficulty which results from the fact that the behavior of businessmen seems to be atypical in many respects—"typical" being their behavior in the past and the behavior ascribed to them in our theories of the business cycle. I believe that this has been the first investment boom which over a considerable period of time was not accompanied by a boom in the stock market. There has been a significant difference between the attitudes of the production managers and those of the financiers in the American economy.

It also seems that the behavior of businessmen with respect to inventory accumulation differs from past experience in periods of price rise. Businessmen are now receiving, more so than in the past, the advice of economists, which may have contributed to their depression-consciousness. The resultant caution may have deprived some business of considerably larger windfall gains, but business as a whole has escaped substantial losses because of this attitude. The awareness of a possible depression on the part of business has also mitigated speculation during the boom; the same attitude may become a hindrance when continued investments will be needed for sustained prosperity.

A new, equally atypical attitude of a different nature is also evolving—namely, the conviction of some businesses that the government really "means business" in its stabilization policy, reducing thereby the likelihood of at least long-lasting depressions and lessening the risk of inadequate markets. The latter attitude seems observable also in the feeling of job security among workers, which has its effect on the spending and saving habits of individuals. (It cannot be decided to what extent the apparent confidence in economic stabilization may be simply a rationalization of an old-fashioned boom psychology.)

Thus the consciousness of depression and confidence in stabilization are developing side by side. They affect the typical business

behavior in different directions and yet they are not quite so inconsistent with each other as may appear at first sight. Possible changes in business behavior and their implications for the cyclical business development should be high on the list of subjects for urgent economic study.

A better understanding of the cycle and better statistical tools should enable us greatly to improve our ability to make accurate economic forecasts. But even a great improvement in this respect will not eliminate the hazards of trying to "call the turns" in business development. The physician finds it easier to detect the existence of a physical defect or predisposition to a disease than the exact time when the defect or predisposition will gain the upper hand over the factors of resistance. Yet nobody would draw the conclusion that a physician cannot be of any help to a patient unless he can predict the exact date when the patient will be forced to take to his bed. Similarly, it is most important for a policy of economic stabilization that maladjustments in the body economic should be correctly identified. Prediction of the turns is desirable because it would facilitate the most effective application of stabilization devices, but it is not essential. For the present we have to recognize that predictions are subject to considerable margins of error and should be evaluated in that light.

In basing policy recommendations on forecasts, attention should always be given to what the effect of the proposed policy would be if the economic prediction should be erroneous. It should be considered whether a policy—for instance, a contemplated tax reduction—is easily reversible or not. It should be considered which is greater in a particular situation—the risk involved in delaying a policy measure or the risk involved in possibly premature action. If we are aware of the limits and margins of error in economic prediction, the harm done by reliance on erroneous predictions can be minimized. Furthermore, the fact that our ability to predict is so limited makes it doubly necessary to explore legislative and administrative flexibilities in economic, and particularly in fiscal, policies.

As a basis for his plans, the businessman needs an unqualified economic forecast that includes forecasts of government action. A government stabilization policy, however, requires, first of all, an analysis of maladjustments and needed adjustments in economic growth. For such an analysis a qualitative and quantitative projection of economic growth and the relationships of the various economic factors that may either sustain or disturb expansion is essential. Such projections (models), prepared for longer and shorter periods, should contemplate alternatives based on a variety of possible courses of government action. We must admit that economics as a science has made only the initial steps into that broad field of constructive investigations. But progress in this respect is as important as, if not more important than, the improvement in our ability to make economic forecasts.

This article has dealt mainly with problems of economics. There are at least equally urgent problems in the fields of political science and public administration related to the policy of economic stabilization, which could not be treated within the limits of this paper.

Our economic system, as we have known it, is unstable. There are those who believe that this instability is bound to undermine its survival and that stability can be achieved only in an authoritatively controlled economy. The Employment Act is based on the philosophy that economic stability is not inconsistent with an economic system that preserves the individual freedoms essential for a democracy. Yet the Act recognizes that there is no simple trick to accomplish its objectives. The Act is only the beginning of the road. Progress without instability—that is, balanced economic expansion—requires improved legislative and administrative procedures, adjustments in the attitudes of management and labor and in the institutional patterns of their relationship, and last, but not least, a reorientation of much of our professional thinking.

(Council of Economic Advisers, Executive Office of the President)

THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION*

BY WILBERT E. MOORE

THE existing literature on conditions in the so-called undeveloped areas of the world reveals a good deal about the attitudes of primitives and peasants toward industrial work, but the direct evidence is at best fragmentary and inconclusive. Pending field research into this specific problem in certain specific areas, it is desirable, therefore, to examine what can be gleaned from social theory in regard to the problem of adaptation to new economic forms,¹ and to determine whether any useful generalizations can be drawn which will serve as a conceptual framework for empirical observations.

In this endeavor two main lines of inquiry suggest themselves. One is the question of incentives to work: the motivations that lead men to accept or refuse economic activity. The other is the still broader question of the principles that govern cultural change and cultural interaction: the conditions that lead one culture to accept or refuse new ways that are offered by another culture. Both questions are, of course, far too complex for any thorough discussion in short space. The following pages will explore only certain of their aspects which are relevant to the central theme of this study: the reception of industrialism in hitherto nonindustrial

* EDITORS' NOTE—This is a brief digest, prepared by Elizabeth Todd, of a study made by Dr. Moore as part of a research project on "Attitudes of Native Labor Toward Industrial Work." It follows a similar digest, drawn from the same project, which appeared in the March 1948 issue of *Social Research*, under the title, "Primitives and Peasants in Industry." The project is being conducted by Dr. Moore for the Institute of World Affairs and the Office of Population Research, Princeton University.

¹ Bibliographical documentation has been omitted from the text for reasons of space, but a list of works that have provided material for this survey is presented at the end of the article.

areas. It should be emphasized that the ultimate desirability of industrialization is not the point at issue. Whether desirable or not, industrial activities are being spread to all parts of the world, and the problem of present concern is the general principles that govern the degree and nature of their acceptance.

Incentives to Work

The attribution of motives is one of the most hazardous tasks in social analysis. As subjective states of mind, motives are not directly observable. They must be inferred from action, from statements by the actor, from knowledge of the actor and of the situation in which he acts, from tested theories of behavior. Yet an understanding of motives is essential in any nonstatistical attempt to appraise the probable course of individual behavior in given situations. The following examination of scientific thinking on the subject of labor incentives will turn first to economic analyses, specifically to wage theory as developed by the classical economists and their predecessors and by the marginal utility theorists whose influence is still powerful today. Sociological and psychological analyses of economic incentives, which view the problem in more general terms, will then be considered in the following section.

Wage Theory. A central characteristic of industrialism is specialization in the labor performed, which necessarily means a wage system. Notwithstanding the importance of "social income" and "perquisites of office," directly payable in goods and services, it is not likely that an economic system based on labor specialization can operate in the complete absence of wages. Indeed, in analyses of the early periods of western industrialism the question of workers' incentives, so far as it was considered at all, was discussed entirely in these terms. In large part these older theories have now been superseded, but they have by no means disappeared from economic action: archaic views of labor motivation have frequently informed the decisions of enterprisers in their dealings with native laborers. Moreover, the early analyses of wages coin-

cided with the first stirrings of industrialism in the west, and therefore it may be contended that they are particularly relevant to the problem of labor recruitment today in areas only beginning their industrial development.

The aspect of wage theory which is relevant in this discussion is the supply price of labor, that is, the determinants of the worker's willingness to offer his services. Much of economic discussion on the problem of wages is concerned with the demand price of labor, that is, with labor as a cost of production, but that is not significant in the present context. This distinction must be clearly maintained, as it is crucial in a study of the shift of workers to industrial employment.

Among the preclassical writers on economic questions, wages were not a primary concern, but those who turned their attention to the supply and cost of labor, chiefly the mercantilists, expounded a fairly consistent view which was the precursor of the "iron law" theory of the classical economists. Its substance was that workers are essentially lazy, and will never work harder than is required by the mere necessity of staying alive; thus it was held that wages and labor productivity are inversely related, and that therefore wages should be kept at as low a level as comformable with mere subsistence. It may be noted that if labor is assumed to be motivated merely by hunger, the concept that man is rationally acquisitive can apply only to capitalists or enterprisers: the worker, untouched by acquisitiveness, is not an "economic man."

In the development from the mercantilists through the early and the later classical economists this view was subjected to various modifications in emphasis and reasoning. For one thing, the explanation and justification of low wages came to be formulated in more demographic terms: through changes in the age and incidence of marriage, higher wages would produce a larger supply of workers and thus wages would drop down again to their minimum level. This meant a distinction between the short run, in which workers were acknowledged to be "economic men" in their movement toward occupations and efforts that provided

higher wages, and the long run, in which the concept of a subsistence wage level was supposed to apply.

It began to be believed, too, that workers labor not only to keep themselves alive but also to maintain certain "customary standards" which vary from group to group. This new emphasis on "customary standards" at least touched upon the increased importance of workers as consumers in the domestic market—a point that the mercantilists, concentrating primarily on improving foreign trade relations, did not consider. Moreover, theorists became less exclusively concerned with the general level of wages, and began to consider the question of differing wages for different kinds of productive activity. Adam Smith, in particular, touched on many determinants of wage differentials under conditions of specialization, mentioning such factors as differences in talent, in costs of training, in toil and trouble, and thus explicitly introducing nonbiological and nonmaterial considerations into the question of work incentives; in fact, he even suggested that a high-wage policy might in some circumstances be justifiable on motivational grounds. In short, the worker came to be regarded not merely as an instrument that happened to be animate, but as at least partly an "economic man," having some participation, albeit limited, in the rationally acquisitive considerations that prompted the actions of enterprisers.

The general tenor of these views is largely explainable, of course, by the circumstances in which they were developed; but, more important in the present context, these circumstances were in many respects similar to the situation that exists today in various areas newly entering the orbit of industrialism. In overall numerical terms an adequate supply of labor, at least potentially; very little technical specialization in the factories, and thus not much need for highly diversified skills; at the same time, an economic organization more congenial to crafts and small-scale agriculture than to the more rational demands of industry—these and various other characteristics of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries can be found today in many areas.

But the parallelism between two parts of the world undergoing industrialization at different periods of history must not be overestimated. As the industrial method of production moves to new areas it encounters cultural environments that differ in fundamental ways from one another, ranging from the highly developed civilizations of China and Japan to the tribal cultures of parts of Africa—a diversity far greater than that of Britain and the European continent at the end of the eighteenth century. Moreover, the temporal trend cannot be overlooked—the difference between the eighteenth or early nineteenth century and the twentieth. Social values have changed very considerably since the industrial revolution. Political officials and native leaders in newly developing countries are increasingly sensitive to foreign or simply entrepreneurial “exploitation.” The principles of social legislation as well as of industrial activity have spread far beyond the western centers, and often the first is in advance of the second: economic development tends more and more to come under the purview and even the active sponsorship of governments, and thus to be promoted along lines more explicitly social than in the early era of private enterprise.

In view of such far-reaching differences it seems likely that the classical economists' views of labor motivation have only a vestigial relevance today in newly developing areas: so far as these views are still tacitly accepted by officials and enterprisers they constitute a factor in the reception of industrial processes. But on the whole there appears to be no more reason to expect a repetition of the ideological patterns of early western industrialism than there is to expect an exact recapitulation of technological developments. The late arrivals are benefiting from experience accumulated earlier, and just as they need not reinvent the power loom they need not learn for themselves whether the obvious advantages of an advanced technology can be combined with subsistence wages.

The classical writers, for all their insight, sometimes only incidental, into the growing dynamics of capitalism, worked out their principles on the basis of certain explicit or implicit assump-

tions that later developments and later theory have called into question—the assumption of perfect competition, for example, and philosophical preconceptions arising from the specific social conditions of their time and place. The goals of economic activity were taken for granted as predominantly “economic,” or monetary. With all their qualifications, their essential belief was that since man works for material gain, in the form of wages—or interest, or rent, or profit—the ultimate purpose of economic activity is material gain. They gave very little emphasis to the fact that monetary returns may be the necessary means for the attainment of highly different ends, and that those ends are not always biological, or even material.

In the striving for an analysis of work motivation that would fit alike the uniformity and the impressive variation of human behavior it was only a question of time—and not very much time—before new principles were introduced, in the rise of utility theory. Certain aspects of the concept of “marginality” had been emphasized by Ricardo, but later formulations generalized it to include the subjective preferences of buyers and workers, expressed in terms of marginal utility. Thus price was regarded as expressing an equilibrium of utilities, and wages were regarded as determined not only by the productivity of the marginal worker but also by his judgment of the relative utilities of work and leisure, as expressed in his willingness to work for given wages.

This theoretical development brought all economic behavior within a single set of rules; indeed, it went even further, and subsumed the whole of human behavior under its principles, providing overdue recognition of the multitude and variety of human aspirations. Therefore it has a certain attractiveness for comparative analysis, for it is transportable beyond institutional boundaries. But what it gained in universality, it perforce lost in relevance to specific situations. The ultimate goals of activity, and their interrelations, are not specified, but are viewed only as subjective attitudes toward the means of attaining them. And the provision of a common explanation for diverse actions provides

no insight into the causes for the differences in those actions. The refusal of married women to work in factories on Saturday afternoons, even at higher wage rates, stems from circumstances different from those that lead natives to refuse to work on certain holidays, though in both cases the utility of wages is less than the utility of leisure. Even in purely monetary terms, the choice between working and not working depends not on the utility of leisure as such but on the proposed use of it: a native worker, after achieving a very limited monetary objective, may desire a "leisure" that permits him to return to his own community, but an urban industrial worker may choose leisure only at a considerably higher level of earnings, not only because he has no other source of support but also because his desired activities require an expenditure beyond ordinary living costs.

Cultural and Psychological Relativism. The problem of the range and diversity of work motivation, touched on in utility theory and then obscured by its global application, has been dealt with more constructively by scholars not primarily identified with the inner sanctum of economic theory. The first major challenge to the motivational aspects of wage theory came from developments within the science of economics—from studies of the historical, ethical, and sociological setting of western industrialism, specifically western capitalism; but the concurrent weakening of notions about the intrinsic "nature of man" was furthered by developments in the other social sciences, particularly by the increasing interest in psychology and anthropology. The background of all these tendencies was the rapid extension of industrial organization, and the shift from absolutism toward relativism in the effort to apprehend it.

Among the analysts of western capitalism, Marx and Veblen were most challenging in their approach to the question of workers' motivation. Both firmly denied the concept of economic man, motivated fundamentally by an urge for personal material gain, and both charged economic science, as well as contemporary economic organization, with a degradation of the human person-

ality. The existence of a segmented, routinized, money-stimulated working class is, they held, inherent only in the current capitalist mode of production, not in industrialism itself. Marx was concerned not with economic motivations, as such, but with the motivations of economic classes locked in struggle with each other, workers against enterprisers. Veblen, in his emphasis on the "instinct of workmanship," came closer to the formulation of a universal incentive, but, as is evident from his scathing analysis of "pecuniary emulation," he regarded this incentive as thwarted and distorted under the capitalist form of enterprise.

These transformations of the older and simpler doctrines of economic motivation were both aided and supplemented by the accumulating studies of primitive cultures. For all their evidence of the pitfalls in generalizations about the inherent nature of man, some of the early students of anthropology regarded the mentality of primitives as essentially different from that of "civilized" man: the primitive was alleged not to think logically, but mystically and symbolically, and to rely not on rational but on magical controls of his environment. This dichotomy of primitive and nonprimitive was abandoned, however, as anthropologists extended their range and improved their procedures.

Thus it came to be recognized that primitive man, though limited in many fields of factual information, is by no means incapable of, or averse to, rational and technically efficient action. The Trobriander, for example, knows well enough that no amount of magic will build a canoe for him. The Trobriander also knows that no rational procedures will give him good weather and a big supply of fish, and thus he supplements his technical efforts with magic and ritual. It was realized that the difference between primitive and civilized lies not in psychic constitution but in the context of goals and functions and attitudes in which activities are pursued. In profound contrast to the tendencies in industrial societies, economic relations in primitive societies are not sharply distinguished from other social relations, and economic advantage, though certainly valued, is not a dominant imperative. Reciproc-

ity within the traditional social organization is more highly regarded than private gain.

Concurrent developments in sociology and psychology and even in historiography were part of the same stream, flowing in a strong current away from any universalistic interpretation of behavior that was deduced from what exists here and now. The presumption that material or biological incentives are automatically dominant in economic life, or constitute a drive that can be analyzed as a thing in itself, has been replaced by an emphasis on the social context in which economic activities take place, and by an awareness that motives reflect the normative order of particular societies and groups: the individual acts within a structured situation, which both defines the expected behavior and provides the rewards and penalties that insure reasonable conformity. In this broad line of development many theories and interpretations have come and gone, but in regard to the motivations of primitives and peasants in entering or not entering newly developing industrial activities, three main principles can be abstracted from the general tendencies in present-day social analysis.

First, the importance of the wage incentive depends on the importance of alternative incentives. In all societies there are many motives for working—a variety of ends toward which the individual aims his productive activity. But these goals should not be confused with the immediate incentives which provide the means of their attainment. This distinction is particularly important in an industrial economy, where specialization of labor demands a generalized medium of exchange, which means a wage system. Wages as such are an effective incentive only in so far as the individual's ultimate wants can be satisfied by purchase. It is true that wages may have a direct, symbolic value as a recognized measure of prestige and esteem, but this is only a derivative of their function as a means of purchase. In highly industrialized countries the wants of man have become so commercialized that wages are highly important as an immediate incentive, but in newly developing areas their significance to the potential worker

depends in large measure on alternative means of support and of acquiring desired goods, and on alternative systems of social valuation.

Second, the importance which attaches to individual competitive drives lends an equal importance to their recognition through the possibility of greater rewards or higher position. No society is wholly without elements of competition in the placement of individuals, but in primitive and peasant societies position in the economic as well as in the social order is, as a rule, traditionally fixed. A complex division of labor demands, however, at least an approximation to reward by merit: the standards determining position and change must have some relevance to individual productive capacity. And this means that there must be a normative system that both prompts the individual to develop his potential talents, and sanctions the rewards as approximately equitable. Thus a crucial problem in the industrialization of undeveloped areas is the stimulation of individual aspirations and the assurance of adequate rewards for superior achievement.

Finally, a third conclusion for the present problem which is suggested by the accumulating analyses of industrial incentives and attitudes is that, even in a highly industrialized economy, an important incentive is provided by the nonmaterial rewards of the job. No job can be evaluated wholly in monetary terms. In some measure the immaterial satisfactions arise from individual suitability or predilection, but to a large extent they come also from working relationships and from the judgment of those who matter in the individual's social situation. Workers seek prestige and esteem, social as well as material security, pleasant working relationships, fun and change. Industrial activity is necessarily based on the principle of individual competence, but it is based also on the requirement that many persons work together for the task in hand. If the job is so oriented on technical competence alone, so rationalized, that it provides no chance for personal attachments, or offers no opportunity for enjoyment and change and other breaks in the tension, or has no relation to family or com-

munity ties, if it has no standing under the recognized social standards, then the incentive to work is certainly smaller than in a work situation where the necessary interdependence of values is recognized. If these immaterial aspirations are denied by the organization of production they are sought in other ways, very likely by purchasing substitutes with the financial rewards for reluctant cooperation.

These facts have led theorists and practitioners alike to question the wisdom and effectiveness of the overwhelming emphasis on financial rewards. There is an increasingly widespread conviction that modern industrial societies have pushed material production, and the material rewards of individuals, to the point of threatening the stability of the system as a whole. A seemingly obvious but frequently neglected principle of social organization is that reliance upon any single incentive is a weaker and less certain basis for cooperation than reliance upon several motives that run in the same direction. In any productive system—even in one whose values are predominantly materialistic—there are definite limits to the continuous elaboration of efficiency, for no social system can survive if it throws its energies into the pursuit of a single interest or function. The production of commodities cannot be the single function of any society, nor can production for use be the single motive of individuals.

If these considerations are valid for industrial workers in the western countries, there is reason to believe that they have even more weight in regard to the primitive or peasant who enters industrial employment with a nonindustrial set of values. It seems clear that it is neither necessary nor desirable to uproot the native laborer not only from his familiar surroundings but also from his scheme of values and attachments. If this leads, as appears inevitable, to a fractional and unstable devotion to the new tasks, the old ways are lost without benefit to the new. Available evidence indicates that some disruption of established ways is unavoidable in the introduction of modern forms of economic activity, but this need not mean a sharp cleavage. In view of the

fact that this problem of the worker as a "whole man" has only recently been recognized in older industrial countries, it is not surprising that very little practical attention has been given it in the newly developing areas.

This review of theories of economic motivation can be quite simply summarized. The incentives specifically relevant to economic activity vary widely from one culture to another, and are to be adequately understood only within particular institutional contexts. On the other hand, the aspirations that can be satisfied by the industrial mode of production are far more diverse than was formerly believed, and therefore there is no *prima facie* reason for assuming that industrialism is intrinsically incompatible with other cultural systems. These two considerations, equally cogent, add up to the conclusion that primitives and peasants can be expected to enter successfully into industrial activity, to the extent that their social structure is, or becomes, compatible with the incentives offered them. The primitive will work effectively, in industrial as in nonindustrial production, if his activities fit a meaningful pattern of social existence. In this he is not different from any worker.

It is no more necessary than it is desirable to repeat all the dismal experience of the older industrial economies by attempting to cling to an overly simple doctrine of labor motivation, or by trying merely to superimpose industrial procedures and attitudes on nonindustrial communities. But any effort to avoid those costly mistakes must recognize the far-reaching differences between primitive and western societies, and realize that there must be adaptation in the new as well as in the old.

The Process of Cultural Adaptation

What, now, can be learned from social theory regarding this mutual adaptation between a given and an impinging cultural system? More specifically, how far, in what form, and under what conditions is a nonindustrial culture likely to take on the attitudes and standards that go with the industrial organization of economic

activity? This, too, is a complex question, full of ifs and buts that are not easily reducible to generalization. The following pages will attempt little more than a listing of certain specific factors that are determining influences, grouping them according to whether they pertain to the nature of the contact or to the nature of the indigenous culture.

The Nature of the Contact. What may be termed the quantitative aspects of the contact between an indigenous and a foreign culture require little elaboration. Obviously, the greater the number of lines or points of contact, the greater the likelihood that the new influences will make themselves felt: they can scarcely operate where rough terrain, poor communications, and weak central administration make for isolation and an ignorance of alternatives. Wherever western civilization and cultural influences have already appeared in the nonindustrial areas, the native cultures have in some degree and in some way been changed, because of the mere presence of strangers, the mere awareness of alien ideas and customs. The response may be positive or negative, uncritically receptive or cautiously selective, but the very fact of response means change.

The sheer quantitative significance of contact is exemplified by the role of cities or towns as centers of diffusion. It is noteworthy that the cities of the world are more "cosmopolitan" than the rural communities, that western influences in undeveloped areas are usually first evident and first accepted in relatively urban centers. Not only do the newcomers go first to the cities, but the cities themselves act as distribution points and sources of change for the outlying regions.

It is clear that the influence of foreign cultures will be stronger if the contact is continuous and permanent rather than consisting of a wide variety of transitory relations. This is particularly true of industrial influences, and it may be added that industrial contacts are particularly likely to be continuous. Industry, unlike many forms of commercial activity, demands a considerable stability of social relationships, because of the time gap between raw

material and finished product, the heavy investment in fixed capital, the advantages of more or less steady operation. Enterprises may of course fail and be abandoned, but the natural tendency is for manufacturing industry to have a continuous and therefore cumulative effect upon the native culture. This may be less true of mining: especially the exploitation of a waning resource may prompt little long-run consideration of relations with the indigenous populations. But even if there is a high turnover in employment, as may occur in the beginning even in manufacturing, this may serve to spread the influence of the new form of activity to ever wider circles in the native population. And in any case, the economic disadvantages of constant replacement and new training are likely to induce the enterpriser to stabilize his relations with native workers so far as possible.

The real substance of the problem of cultural contact lies, however, in its qualitative rather than in its quantitative aspects. So far as the foreign culture is concerned these may be roughly classified according to whether they concern the cultural characteristics involved in the contact, the agents that represent the foreign culture, or the methods of imposition or persuasion. It need hardly be stressed that these distinctions are only analytical conveniences and that actually these three aspects of cultural impingement are inseparably interrelated.

Since it is impossible for entire cultures to be in contact, it is obvious that the particular aspects of the foreign culture which are actually involved in the contact are a very important consideration. Unless it be smugly supposed that nonindustrial cultures are naively and gratefully receptive to every new idea, form, or practice, it must be granted that the extent and type of change depend in large part on what is offered, and that not everything offered will be accepted. Some cultural traits may be adopted enthusiastically; some may be actively combated, or ignored, or accepted only as a temporary novelty; some may be taken readily but be adapted to uses quite different from the original function—possibly appearing in the different context of the native culture

as a grotesque eccentricity rather than as a functioning part of a whole.

This raises the question whether there are certain cultural elements that are intrinsically or generally more transplantable than others, a question that has often been debated by anthropologists. Probably it is safe to say that, in general, simple elements or attributes are more readily taken over than complex ones, simple ideas rather than abstract philosophies, forms rather than complete cultural meanings. Thus it may well be true, as is often contended, that tools and other tangible objects of use and ornament provide the first bridge between two contrasting cultures.

It would assuredly be a mistake, however, to deduce from this the generalization that a demonstrably superior technology is readily accepted simply because it is demonstrably superior. As has already been emphasized, no productive technique can be considered without regard for the values and goals and interests that surround it; and it certainly cannot be assumed that goals are everywhere the same or that rational efficiency is everywhere the dominant principle for attaining them. For the world to beat a path to the door of the man who has invented a superior mousetrap, it must first be interested in catching mice, and in using a mechanical instrument for the purpose.

Thus it certainly cannot be said that industrial processes as such are particularly susceptible of transference from one culture to another. The industrial mode of production is a manifold complex of interrelations, and even if some of its attributes are quickly taken over by a nonindustrial people, this does not mean that all will be, or even that the elements accepted will be sufficient for the purposes. It may well be that the cultural elements most enthusiastically adopted will actually impede the development of an effective industrial organization of economic activity.

If there is no single cultural element that is always taken over readily by other cultures, it follows that the determining factor is less any particular characteristics as such than the penumbra of surrounding circumstances. One important consideration in this

respect is the nature of the agents that represent one culture to another.

In the history of western contacts with native cultures the western newcomers have been of many types, which are, however, roughly distinguishable. They have come as traders, interested primarily in the possibilities of commerce; as missionaries who attempted very deliberately to introduce western religious and other noncommercial orientations to the "heathen"; as individual migrants entering native social organizations through a kind of infiltration; as military conquerors and rulers; as colonial administrators not committed to permanent residence; as settlers backed by home or local colonial authorities in their claims upon land and other resources formerly held by natives; as enterprisers offering local employment.

Naturally there is a good deal of variation in the effectiveness of these various agents as transmitters of their own cultures. Usually not one but several of them are present in any given community, and it is quite possible that their respective influences will not be consistent either in purpose or in actual effect. In South Africa, for example, the education provided by missionaries has not been very compatible with the limited role allowed to native workers by their European employers; and similarly, the wages offered by foreign employers have not always been balanced by a provision of goods and services on which the wages could be spent.

Unquestionably the type of agents—lay or clerical, military or commercial—who establish the initial contact has a determining effect on subsequent developments: a conquering army does not set in motion the same chain of effects that is produced by a group of missionaries. Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that the variation depends in very large measure on individuals rather than on categories: a trader may cut a swathe like a relentless invader, or he may move among the people like a benign deity. Even a conqueror has sometimes been welcomed. And quite apart from this matter of individual differences in such qualities as intelligence, character, intention, understanding, there are the important

questions of prestige and authority, which will presently come up again, for fuller consideration. It should be stressed here, however, that the newcomers' prestige in their own communities at home has little relevance: it is likely to be unknown, or apprehended only with a considerable margin of error, and even if it is accurately understood it may not be granted in the new situation.

Not directly relevant to the process of social change, as such, but significant for its meaning, is the representativeness of the agents who bring one culture to another. In view of the heterogeneous nature of even typical western cultures, and the range of allowable and actively sanctioned individual variation, it can hardly be expected that the westerner who goes to a new land will very accurately represent his community or his vocation or his class, though the natives are likely to assume that he does. The more such newcomers there are, the more opportunity there is to correct or qualify these judgments, but in many areas of western penetration the outsiders have tended, as a group, toward certain typical characteristics that give a somewhat onesided impression of the culture they presumably represent.

In extending their ways to the native community the methods used by the agents of foreign cultures range the whole distance from inaction—as may be the case with an individual adventurer or trader who has no desire to bring about a change—to the whole apparatus of imperial conquest. So far as deliberate industrialization is concerned, an important distinction rests on the question of sovereignty—whether the native population is sovereign in its own territory, or whether the foreigners have taken on the mantle of authority. So pervasive, however, is the influence of foreign industrialization that this distinction may be scarcely more than nominal.

It would be impossible to examine systematically the ways in which foreign enterprisers and administrators have actively or inactively impressed their own cultural characteristics on indigenous peoples. Nor is such an effort needed, for the question of

the means whereby industrial processes and attitudes have been introduced to primitive and peasant cultures has been dealt with extensively in the empirical section of this study. A few specific considerations are, however, worth stressing in the present context.

As has already been mentioned, the mere presence of foreigners, and the mere awareness of foreign activities and customs, will bring about some change in native attitudes: the very fact that a new element has been added causes a change in the whole, whether the new element acts as an explosive or only as a catalyzer. And certainly, the more active the foreigners, and the more pervasive and continuous their influence, the more substantial will be the change that they bring.

This raises the problem of authority and the role of direct and indirect coercion in the process of industrialization in undeveloped areas. It is only partly true that the effectiveness of the new depends on the degree of authority with which it is set forth and perpetuated. An authoritative imposition of new ways produces some measure of conformity—its extent dependent on the effectiveness of the authority—but if the natives' adaptation is grudging and confined to external forms, the resultant cultural changes will represent only a precarious adaptation to the new and not an assimilation of it. This is especially true if some aspects of industrial culture are authoritatively promoted while others are authoritatively withheld, as in the European treatment of South African natives within a system of racial discrimination which demands native labor and at the same time withholds the rights and responsibilities that would give that labor cultural meaning.

The use of force—whether force of arms or force of numbers—has unquestionably played an important part in the spread of western civilization. And the question of ethics which it raises is far beyond the intended scope of this discussion. In purely utilitarian terms, however, it is worth emphasizing that the consolidation and legitimation of power can lead to a constructive as well as to a destructive transformation of the indigenous culture. As history has repeatedly demonstrated, naked coercion is not a dur-

able instrument, and except for external appearances it is not likely to be even an effective one. But direct coercion, and even indirect coercion, is not the sole attribute of authority. Not the exercise of authority as such is decisive in the effective industrialization of undeveloped areas, but the question whether it is used wisely and with regard for process as well as purpose.

The Nature of the Indigenous Culture. One of the few unconditional statements that can be made about cultural interaction is that the influence of a foreign culture is always dependent on the characteristics of the indigenous culture. Even such objective factors as new communicable diseases affect native populations partly in relation to organizational characteristics like type of settlement, degree of mobility, and sanitary practices: if disease is no respecter of persons, it is a respecter of social conditions. And it is not otherwise with ideas, attitudes, and techniques. Here again it is not feasible to attempt more than a categorical outline of a few factors that are particularly important in affecting a culture's receptivity to outside influences.

Cultural integration is a relative matter, as no culture is tightly and completely integrated as a functioning system, with no elements of instability; moreover, even the appraisal of cultural integration is extremely difficult and subject to individual interpretation. Nevertheless, with all due recognition of the elusiveness of this concept, it remains true that in any society the existing degree of integration is an essential factor in determining the susceptibility to outside influences. By and large, an isolated primitive or peasant society can usually be regarded as having a large measure of functional integration. But even in such a community the fundamental functions necessary for survival may be endangered, either by disruptions within the social structure itself or by natural catastrophes such as drought or depletion of resources. If the society is thus in a state of flux or jeopardy—if, for example, it is reft by internal dissensions or rivalries, or if it is confronted with serious difficulties in its food supply—it will be particularly susceptible to influences coming from without.

Another important factor affecting the reception of outside influences is the degree of functional similarity between the old and the new. There is no doubt that foreign influences are more likely to be accepted if they have generally comparable counterparts in the indigenous culture, that is, if they are matched by cultural practices or attitudes or objects that have approximately the same function or goal. In primitive areas, to cite a very simple example, the effort of westerners to limit native mortality is far more generally accepted than their effort to limit fertility; the latter is in itself a less complex matter, but the former encounters fewer cultural barriers, and indeed serves a well-nigh universal goal. It can even be said as a general principle that those cultural traits are most readily acceptable which do not directly violate existing purposes—even though their unanticipated consequences may, of course, be far-reaching. The less comparable are the new and the old functions, and the means of fulfilling them, the more necessary it is to rely on slow fermentation rather than rapid effervescence—or else to foster the change, as in Japan, by a hot-house development sponsored by authoritative leaders.

The significance of this general principle as a matter of practical policy is not diminished by the fact that the exact degree of resemblance between the two cultures is impossible to assess. The question here is not the similarity of cultures as such, but the similarity of particular aspects that are in contact—though of course the full social context cannot be disregarded. In introducing industrialism into undeveloped areas the immediate problem, therefore, is to determine what existing attitudes and procedures are potentially compatible with the new ways, and which are essentially inimical.

As a general rule, economic modernization in the undeveloped areas has tended to start with commercial agriculture and mining and to proceed subsequently to light industry, particularly textile manufactures. It is not only considerations of capital and resources that lead to this sequence, but the fact that these forms of industry demand the least initial change from the native popu-

lation: no great skill is required, traditional loyalties are presumably not greatly affected, working units can be kept small and adapted to local circumstances, and the processes fit, or can be made to fit, existing conceptions of economic activity. The difficulty of establishing even a textile mill in a nonindustrial area is not to be minimized, but it is certainly less than the difficulty of establishing a machine-tool plant.

Closely related to the factor of functional similarity, if that be considered in broad enough terms, is the compatibility of the new influences with existing standards of value and the social structures built upon them. This raises the question of the prestige which attaches to the new cultural influences—an attribute that may have little relation to the foreigners' own scale of values. The sources of prestige are so manifold that this factor can be discussed only in the most general terms, but there is no doubt that if a foreigner or his pursuits or his customs carry prestige, in the eyes of the native community, they are considerably more likely to be accepted than if they have not this advantage—which, as is well known, is sometimes acquired quite unexpectedly.

And not only the prestige of the new is significant, but also that of its first converts; in other words, acceptance is closely related to the system of social stratification. Very often those who have most to gain by accepting new patterns are the submerged and disaffected groups among the natives, and if these are identified with inferior social categories—for example, if they are outcasts, untouchables, former slaves, lower ethnic groups—the innovation has the double handicap of newness and of symbolizing locally defined social inferiority. Conversely, if persons of weight and distinction in the native community can be won over to the new ways, the force of their example is likely to persuade others.

This is a complex matter, however, for it depends also on the rigidity of the social differences. Thus it is possible that acceptance by the higher social groups will not be emulated by those farther down the scale, but will become only a further source of division between the strata. Furthermore, western industrial cul-

ture has its own system of stratification, specifically a rather sharp division between labor and managerial ranks. Thus while it is true that industrialism is more likely to be accepted if it is adapted to the existing system of stratification, it is also true—particularly in any large-scale industrial organization—that the existing system may present a formidable barrier unless, or until, it is itself modified in the direction of the flexibility which industrial activities demand.

This latter consideration brings up a point so important that it cannot be overemphasized. In the foregoing survey, necessarily schematic and somewhat cursory, the reciprocal and cumulative nature of cultural contact has been obscured by the emphasis on specific elements that enter into the process. What we are concerned with is not two static entities in juxtaposition, but a continuous interaction, not only between the foreign and the native culture but also between the new elements and the old within the native culture itself.

The industrialism that is the focus of this interaction is itself more than tools and skills and manufactured trinkets. It represents an intricate relationship of complementary structures and functions, and it depends upon social and psychological characteristics that are not immediately or directly associated with industrial activity as such. In its spread to new areas the latecomers may skip some of the processes and problems that the originators had to work out for themselves, but they cannot effectively take over the form without its context. A complicated machine may be transported quite successfully, and may even be satisfactorily operated, with a few simple instructions. But its successful maintenance and its fulfilment of its function depend on a vast array of other interrelated factors, such as mechanical knowledge, available parts and supplies, a market for the output, transportation and communication facilities, some measure of literacy if only for the purpose of reading directions. Industry comes wrapped in a bundle. In the beginning it may enter a culture in the form of a few isolated strands, but its substantial development depends upon

the roughly parallel or collateral development of the whole complex.

This development, however, is an intricate process of give and take. As various elements of a complex industrialism are absorbed by the nonindustrial community they are not mechanically received, but pass through a greater or lesser modification as they become part of another cultural fabric. The form may remain unchanged, but the meaning and function may become quite different. A simple and familiar example is the transformation that often occurs in the use made of tangible objects: thus a major market for silk top hats is now among otherwise meagerly clothed African natives. This shift in meaning occurs not only in the use of things, but also in the reception of procedures and attitudes; in such matters it may be based on a confusion of shadow and substance, with the result that the form is followed, almost as a magical rite, in the assumption that the reality is thereby captured. And meanwhile changes must occur in the impinging industrialism itself, changes in emphasis and direction if not in actual intention.

Not only is the new likely to be transformed in the process of its combination with the old, but the reception of any element works in ever-widening circles to reach even those cultural characteristics that are not directly concerned. It may be attempted, quite deliberately, to single out for acceptance only certain particular traits in the cultural complex represented by industrialism, and to reject the others. This is frequently the attitude of primitive and peasant peoples, who hope to enjoy the benefits of expanded and diversified production without accepting the other conditions that would undermine traditional customs and institutions. Certainly white rulers of colored peoples have attempted to impose limits on the natives' acceptance of industrial civilization. But such artificial limitations are frustrated not only by the dynamics of cultural interaction but even by the dynamics of industrialism itself.

The effects of industrialization cannot be neatly calculated and

controlled. Technically and also socially each step is chained to others, and any innovation, however simple or limited, sets up a continuing series of further changes. At least some of these attending changes will certainly be unanticipated by either the newcomers or the native population. It is scarcely likely that anyone will welcome all of them. But there is no intrinsic necessity that makes any particular pattern of change inevitable.

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COLONIAL POLICY OF THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY

BY PETER C. SPEERS

AT THE conclusion of the Labour government's first full-length report on colonial affairs in the House of Commons, Colonel Oliver Stanley, the last Colonial Secretary of the Coalition government, declared: "The right hon. Gentleman [George Hall, then Secretary of State for Colonies in the Labour government] started his speech by telling us that since the electoral events of July, it was necessary for him to make a declaration of policy for the party now in power. I listened to it with great interest, and, I must confess, with a certain amount of familiarity. It did not seem to differ greatly in essentials from the policies which have been declared on previous occasions."¹ The implication is clear—that the advent of the Labour government has made little or no difference in British colonial policies. How much truth is there in the Conservative M. P.'s contention? What changes, if any, have there been in Great Britain's government of her overseas possessions as a result of Labour's coming to power?

To answer the question thus posed, we must first examine British colonial policies under previous governments. We may then review the criticisms of Conservative and Coalition colonial policies made before 1945 by the Labour party. And finally, we must consider the actual colonial policies of the Labour government since July 1945 in order to see what Labour's achievements have been and to compare these achievements with the party's pre-1945 pretensions.

I

During most of the nineteenth century the colonial possessions which Great Britain had acquired in the great wars of the pre-

¹ *Hansard*, July 9, 1946 (425 H. C. Deb. 5 s., col. 262).

ceding hundred years lay neglected and almost forgotten. The colonies served mainly as naval coaling stations, penal colonies, and proving grounds for the talents of British younger sons.

In the last quarter of the century, however, with the rise of a new imperialism and the growth of the new colonial empires of France, Italy, Germany, and Japan, Great Britain developed a new interest in her colonial possessions. With the accelerated growth of industry, too, there was a new interest in these areas as potential markets and sources of raw materials. There was a race with rival imperialist powers for the acquisition of the remaining colonial areas in Africa, Asia, and Oceania. There was a new spirit of empire—a spirit fostered by the church, business, and the army—which penetrated all classes of society. All these sources affected Great Britain perhaps more than any of the other colonial powers. As a result, the last decade or so of the nineteenth century witnessed not only a reawakened and intensified interest in colonies, but the first serious attempt to review their condition and potentialities and the first effort to form a deliberate policy for their governing.

The colonial policy, formed in those closing years of the century and maintained for the first three, or even four, decades of the present century, was never clearly or specifically stated by British governments. It was often changed to meet changing conditions, and it was often the result of on-the-spot improvisations to cope with local or temporary problems. Nevertheless, certain general bases of this policy can be discerned.

British colonial policy, like that of other imperialist powers, was based, in the first place, on exploitation. The colonial territories were considered to be the absolute property of the United Kingdom, which felt itself free to exercise in them all the rights of ownership. So long as there were occasional sops to public opinion in the form of native schools and hospitals, Great Britain (or the colonial administrators and private businessmen on the spot) felt free to rule the colonies with but one objective in mind—profit for Britain and for British business.

Specifically, this exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of the home country was effected by (1) the payment by trading firms of very low prices for the colonial products in which they dealt, (2) the abuse of native labor, both by the payment of extremely low wages and by means of various more or less disguised forms of forced labor,² and (3) the draining of natural resources from an area. Dealing in most instances with ignorant and gullible native chieftains, British concerns operating in the colonies were able to acquire land, mineral rights, and other advantages on extremely easy terms. The results, of course, were fantastic profits for the British business organizations conducting enterprises in the colonies.

A second basis of British colonial policy was that while broad political directives were issued from the Colonial Office in London, economically the colonies were left very much on their own. With the exception of small and infrequent direct grants from the British exchequer the colonies were to support themselves. In exceptional instances the Imperial government was willing to admit that a colony's resources were insufficient to cope with a necessary project and permission was granted to raise a commercial loan on the London market.

A third basis of British colonial policy was the principle of trusteeship, which proclaimed that Britain held her colonial possessions only as trusts for their aboriginal inhabitants, that it was her duty to train these peoples for national independence, and that when that training was complete she would step aside and give control to the native governments. Having once agreed in principle to eventual independence for her colonies, Great Britain was in no great hurry to make that independence an actuality. While the principle served to ease the collective British conscience, while its acceptance prevented the growth of the more barbaric forms of colonial exploitation, and while a few high-minded

² For example, the imposition of a poll tax or other taxes, to be paid in currency which the native could acquire only by working for a British business concern or a white settler.

colonial administrators labored sincerely for its fulfilment, trusteeship could claim few constructive achievements.

Moreover, acceptance of the trusteeship principle was not unanimous on the part of the public. No matter how hard individual Britons might strive for its realization, there was continued opposition not only to the principle itself but to the initiation of any really progressive measures within the colonies. There was not only actual opposition from various conservative groups which saw their interests threatened by any change in the colonial status quo, but also indifference on the part of the British public to conditions in the colonies. However benevolent the average Britisher might feel toward the primitive peoples under his ultimate control, he only rarely made any effort to translate this benevolence into action. Only in cases of large-scale insurrection in the colonies or of gross maladministration did the British general public bother to acquaint itself with colonial problems or to express its attitude toward these problems through its representatives in Parliament. One effect of this public indifference has been what one may call the timelag in British colonial thinking as compared with home affairs. While the British people were fighting for progressive legislation in the form of social insurance laws, liberal trade union laws, and the like, in Britain, their apathy toward colonial matters precluded any demand on their part for the extension of these same measures to the dependent territories. Consequently, much of the social legislation which has been in effect in the United Kingdom itself for thirty or even forty years has only very recently been duplicated in the colonies.

Thus British colonial policy during the greater part of the fifty years following the rebirth of imperialism in the 1880-90 period may be summed up as lip-service acceptance of the principle of trusteeship with no very energetic attempt to put that principle into practice. The first small break in this policy came with the passage of the Colonial Development Act in 1929, whereby the home government for the first time relaxed its insistence on

colonial self-support and recognized in principle the need for aid to the colonies. The Act authorized the Treasury to make advances, in the form of loans or free grants, to nonself-governing colonies to promote the development of their resources. That many of the old notions about the function of the Empire and of the proper British attitude toward her possessions still remained, however, is revealed by the statement of purposes contained in the Act itself, which declares that the Act is constituted to aid the development of colonial industrial and agricultural resources as a means of promoting "commerce with, or industry in, the United Kingdom." The sum involved, moreover, was comparatively small—10 million pounds to be made available over a period of ten years.

The Colonial Development Act of 1929, then, represented only a slight shift in the course of British colonial policy. A more decided break with the past came in July 1940, a date that can be considered to mark the beginning of a new era in colonial policy. With the Colonial Development and Welfare Act³ of that date the proviso that colonial development be of benefit to the United Kingdom was discarded, and the welfare of the colonies themselves became the main objective. The sum available to the colonies was increased to 5 million pounds a year, with an additional 500,000 pounds annually to be spent for research. The purposes for which the money might be spent were extended to include education, public health, and housing, as well as the purely material development of colonial industry and agriculture. The method by which it was to be spent called for the submission of detailed development plans by each colony. Upon the approval of these plans, they were to be carried out through use of the funds made available by the Act.

A significant feature of the Colonial Welfare and Development Act of 1940 was its stipulation that no development scheme involving the use of native labor would be approved unless the colony in question gave full recognition to trade unionism and

³ Public General Acts 384 Geo 6, Ch. 40 (1949).

had introduced trade union legislation embodying the principles accepted by the United Kingdom. In order to implement this provision the Colonial Office has sent more than thirty experienced union organizers to the colonies, where they have apparently been highly successful in organizing trade unions entirely native in membership and based on a system of secret balloting. The labor organizer sent to the Gold Coast in 1942, for example, found only 500 workers organized into unions upon his arrival there. Today approximately 10,000 mining and industrial workers are organized into nineteen trade unions in that colony. In Nigeria 50,000 workers have been organized under a similar program.⁴

The Act of 1940, in short, was a radical change from the old laissez-faire colonial policy. It continued and strengthened the principle of aid to the colonies which had been partially accepted in 1929 and marked the first important official recognition by Great Britain of her responsibility to her colonies in helping them to attain reasonable prosperity and adequate standards of living. Recognition of this obligation was reaffirmed in February 1945 with the passage of the second Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The Act of 1945⁵ is designed to serve much the same purposes as its predecessor of 1940, but it increases to 17.5 million pounds the amount which may be drawn upon annually for colonial development schemes and research and sets a new total of 120 million pounds for financing these schemes in the decade beginning in April 1946.

II

Having reviewed British colonial policy up to the general election of 1945, the next step into our inquiry into what changes, if any, the Labour government has wrought in that policy is to examine the Labour party's criticisms of its predecessors' policies and its

⁴ Vernon McKay, "Empires in Transition—British, French and Dutch Colonial Plans," in *Foreign Policy Reports*, vol. 23 (May 1, 1947) pp. 34-37. For further remarks on the organization of trade unions in the colonies, see Section III of this paper.

⁵ Public General Acts 889 Geo 6, Ch. 20 (1944-45).

statements of what its own colonial policy would be upon the election of a Labour government. Consideration must also be given to some of the motives behind Labour's position on colonial matters.

Certainly one factor affecting Labour's colonial policy is that the party is a socialist party. Almost by definition alone, a socialist is an internationalist and a humanitarian, and cannot accept any discrimination between peoples on the basis of race or creed. Inevitably, therefore, Labour must reject the principle of white supremacy and any suggestion that the people of the United Kingdom are inherently better than those of the colonies. Equally inevitable is Labour's rejection of slavery in every form, open or disguised. The British laboring classes, so far as they were able, supported Wilberforce in his struggle for the destruction of slavery in the Empire; and it was the working classes of Britain who constituted in that country the main support of the Northern cause in the United States Civil War. Today, therefore, British socialists feel a strong sense of responsibility for the welfare of the colonial peoples, coupled with a sense of guilt for the past wrongs done them by Great Britain. This socialist sentiment is perhaps the strongest motivation underlying the Labour government's colonial policies.

Labour's generally benevolent attitude toward the colonies and colonial peoples, however, was until the mid-1930's split by the dispute between those who held that Britain should rid herself of all her colonial possessions by granting them immediate freedom and those who held that Britain should retain her colonies while doing everything possible to improve conditions in them—two schools of thought which may be called the "Liquidationists" and the "Ameliorationists." By 1931 the latter school had fairly completely won the field and there were no longer many serious proposals advanced for the immediate freeing of the colonies. With the depredations of Germany, Italy, and Japan, and their treatment of colonial and other conquered "inferior" peoples revealed to the whole world, only the most visionary socialist

could demand that Britain set her colonies free to fall prey to one of the fascist powers or to reactionary power-hungry groups within the colonies themselves.

The Labour party in general has favored the economic and political development of the colonies and opposed their exploitation for the benefit of Great Britain. It has accepted wholeheartedly the principle of trusteeship with all its implications. It has not only accepted that point of view which states, "Of course we shall give the colonies their independence—but only when they are ready for it." It has accepted this viewpoint and gone beyond it to demand that the work of preparation for independence begin at once. Writing on colonial policy in a collection of essays prepared by the Fabian Society early in 1945, Leonard Barnes quoted a statement by Macaulay: "'Many politicians of our time are in the habit of laying it down as a self-evident proposition that no people ought to be free until they are fit to use their freedom. The maxim is worthy of the fool in the old story who resolved not to go into the water until he had learned to swim. If men are to wait for liberty till they become wise and good in slavery, they may wait for ever.'"⁶ Later in the same essay Barnes declared that if British colonial policy is really to be directed toward preparing the colonies for eventual freedom, "a substantial measure of power and responsibility must be passed to the colonial peoples not hereafter, but now."⁷ The Labour party, in other words, affirmed its readiness, if elected, "to subordinate every other consideration to the welfare of the native populations."⁸

Specifically, Labour has held that European enterprise should not be given free rein to seek profits in the colonies to the detriment of the colonial peoples and by methods that would undermine the independence, social institutions, or economic well-being of those peoples. European enterprise "should be confined to

⁶ Leonard Barnes, "A Policy for Colonial Peoples," in *What Labour Could Do; Six Essays Based on Lectures Prepared for the Fabian Society* (London 1945) p. 73.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁸ George Lansbury, *Labour's Way with the Commonwealth* (London 1935) p. 96.

those limits within which it will neither infringe the liberties nor arrest the progress of the native people."⁹ And in keeping with its demands for nationalization at home, the party has maintained that enterprises necessary for the public welfare in the colonies should be government-managed and that "mines and large-scale industries should be run or controlled by the State."¹⁰ In short, Labour has held that the economic development of the colonies should become a major state enterprise, operated on a systematic basis and with the welfare of the colonies themselves as the first consideration of policy.

In the period before it came to power, Labour not only attacked the slowness of progress toward promised political independence in the colonies and their economic exploitation for the sole benefit of the mother country, but also extended its criticisms to include the Colonial Office and Colonial Service and the mechanics of colonial administration. These criticisms, in the main, centered on (1) the lack of Parliamentary interest in and control of colonial affairs, (2) insufficient participation by native peoples in colonial governments and in the Colonial Service, and (3) the poor caliber of men chosen for posts in the Colonial Office and Colonial Service and the inadequate training given them after their selection.

Harold Laski pointed out, for example, that the government of the dependent territories was broken up into so many different functionally and territorially specialized units that a unified policy was difficult to impose.¹¹ This difficulty was aggravated by the inability or unwillingness of Parliament to keep a close check on colonial affairs. For instance, a 1942 report of the Fabian Society's Colonial Bureau commented that "... there are general misgivings as to the adequacy of existing arrangements. Parliamentary supervision is of a somewhat perfunctory kind. The House of

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

¹¹ Harold Laski, "The Colonial Civil Service," in *Political Quarterly*, vol. 9 (October-December 1938) pp. 541-51.

Commons has in the past shown little general interest in colonial policy and finds increasing difficulty in arranging time for the discussion of problems of colonial administration and imperial relationships."¹² To remedy this situation, the report called for the establishment of a Standing Committee on Colonial Affairs, to be appointed from both Houses of Parliament.¹³

Laski's criticisms of the colonial civil service decried the fact that while the growth of colonial schools was providing an increasing body of trained and educated natives, there was no tendency in the service to use the abilities of educated colored people, who were thus, left no chance to have careers in government or to have a voice in the management of their own affairs.¹⁴ The Fabian Society's report made a similar criticism and recommended that there should be wider appointment of natives in colonial governments and that greater scholarship facilities should be provided to train them for government posts.¹⁵

Labour's criticisms of the selection of personnel for the Colonial Office and the Colonial Services held that it tended to choose men from too narrow a source, that it did not demand any knowledge of colonial affairs or even of the social sciences in general, and that definite prejudice was shown in the personal interviews required of every candidate. The result, said Labour, was a service which Laski described in the following terms: "Broadly, it represents the 'public school' mind. It has been trained, therefore, to the acceptance of the historic assumption of empire. It is a mind capable of efficiency and the team-spirit within the limits those assumptions impose. It is rarely a mind which questions them, or looks to innovations in fundamentals."¹⁶ Laski supported this criticism by quoting figures for appointments to the Colonial Service in 1927-29. Of the 260 administrative posts filled in those years, 236 or 90 percent went to men from Oxford

¹² Fabian Society, *Downing Street and the Colonies* (London 1942) p. 80.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94, 100.

¹⁴ Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 547.

¹⁵ Fabian Society, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71, 75, 99.

¹⁶ Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 546.

and Cambridge. The younger British universities, some of them with excellent reputations in the social sciences, were allowed to fill the remaining twenty-four posts.¹⁷ The resulting character of the Colonial Office and the Colonial Service was not such, to say the least, that the ideals and beliefs of the average colonial administrator would agree with those of the average Labour party member. Laski continued: "There is evidence of definite hostility in the service to normal British ideas of civil liberty. Legislation represses nascent trade unionism. Native criticism, particularly the criticism of educated Africans, very easily becomes sedition. The concept of 'law and order' has been accepted on the basis of adjusting its limits predominantly to the needs of white enterprise dependent for its success upon cheap and obedient colored labor."¹⁸

Labour's program for the colonies, then, as stated before the party came into power, may be summed up as being based on (1) putting an end to exploitation of the colonies for the benefit of nonnatives, (2) political advancement of the colonies toward the eventual goal of freedom, (3) economic development under a comprehensive plan involving government direction and government control of mines, public utilities, and large-scale industries, (4) more effective Parliamentary supervision of colonial affairs, (5) increased use of educated natives in the government of their own territories, and (6) reform of the method of selection for the Colonial Office and Colonial Service so as to achieve a broader basis of selection of candidates and a more adequate training of appointees.

III

Our inquiry must now move to an examination of what Labour has actually accomplished since it came to power. Have the suggestions implied in the criticisms outlined above been put into

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 543-44.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 546-47. The criticism, of course, was made before the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 which made the enactment of liberal trade union laws in the colonies almost mandatory.

effect? Has Labour corrected the abuses which it attributed to earlier governments?

At the outset, it must be said that a great deal has been accomplished in the way of both economic and political development. There has been a heavy return of requests from the colonies for allocation of the funds made available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945. These requests have been accompanied by detailed plans for the use of the funds requested, and many of these plans have been approved and put into effect. Of the 120 million pounds authorized by the Act of 1945, a total of 94.5 million pounds has already been allotted as follows:¹⁹

	<i>Millions of Pounds</i>
West Indies	16.5
Asia	7.5
West Africa	30.5
East Africa	13.0
East African regional development	3.5
Central services	23.5

The 23.5 million pounds allotted for central services includes plans for the following:²⁰

	<i>Millions of Pounds</i>
Medical and public health services	4.0
Housing and land settlement	3.0
Agriculture, veterinary, and forestry	5.0
Water and irrigation	6.5
Communications and transport	4.0
Industrial development	0.5

Specific projects for which this money is being spent include the organization of a public corporation in Nigeria to take over, reorganize, and develop all electric power services; a Cameroons Development Corporation to cultivate 250,000 acres of former German estates on a communal basis for the production of rubber, bananas, and oilpalms; and a government-directed board for the

¹⁹ A. Creech Jones, *Labour's Colonial Policy* (London 1947) p. 14.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

purchase, shipment, and sale of all West African cocoa. In Kenya a ten-year project for soil conservation and reconditioning is under way; and in the Central and East African region, as a whole, an extensive examination of water resources is being made with a view to the development of irrigation and hydroelectric schemes.²¹

The most impressive of these schemes, perhaps, is the development corporation in East Africa which has been given control of a vast area of wasteland in Kenya, Tanganyika, and Northern Rhodesia to convert it to the production of groundnuts. The land will be divided into 107 mechanized farms of 30,000 acres each, each with a labor force of about 300 skilled workers, clerks, tractor drivers, and so forth. When in full operation, the scheme is expected to provide employment and homes for some 30,000 natives and about 750 European experts. It is estimated that the groundnuts can be produced at about half the current world price. Their purchase and processing into valuable oils will save Great Britain at least 10 million pounds on her annual food bill and add an equivalent sum to the income of the three colonies involved.²²

It is notable that all these schemes involve government participation in some form or other (often direct management) in the economy of the colonies concerned. This, of course, is to be expected from a socialist government. State economic activity in the colonies has now been extended to include both operation and ownership of many of the means of production. All mineral rights in the colonies, for example, have been or are to be nationalized; and wherever possible mines are to be operated by the government. A memorandum on colonial mining policy²³ issued in December 1946 recommended to colonial governments (1) that mineral rights be vested in the Crown, (2) that no exclusive licenses be granted for all mining in any colony, (3) that mining

²¹ General surveys of these and other development schemes may be found in Rita Hinden, "Socialist Planning in Africa," in *New Statesman and Nation*, vol. 33 (February 15, 1947) p. 128, and in Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

²² See Cmd. 7030, *A Plan for the Mechanized Production of Groundnuts in East and Central Africa, 1947*; Hinden, *op. cit.*, p. 128, and McKay, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

²³ Col. 206, *Colonial Mining Policy, 1946*.

leases be limited to not more than twenty-five years, (4) that satisfactory labor conditions be provided, (5) that mining operations be undertaken directly by the colonial governments if this is necessary to insure the attainment of social objectives, and (6) that government geological surveys replace private prospecting.

To cope with the overall direction of these vast schemes two public corporations have been created by authority of the Overseas Resources Development Bill of November 1947 and placed under the Colonial Economic and Development Council.²⁴ The Colonial Development Corporation, to be administered by the Colonial Secretary, has Treasury funds amounting to 150 million pounds at its disposal for developing the resources (especially the primary resources) of the colonies. The Overseas Food Corporation, responsible to the Minister of Food, likewise has a capital of 150 million pounds at its disposal to promote food production in the colonies "and other British areas." It is the Overseas Food Corporation that will eventually take control of the East African groundnut project.

These two corporations and all the present available resources of the British government, however, are not enough to plan and execute colonial development schemes on the huge scale envisioned by the Labour government; and certainly the colonial governments themselves cannot cope with them singlehanded. As a result, the Labour government has had to by-pass its socialist principles to the extent of enlisting the aid of private business in carrying out some of its schemes. The Colonial Secretary has defended this expedient by declaring: "In big development plans it sometimes happens that we cannot evade using private interests as our agents for a period. It is a fact that they are often the best means we can employ. If the arrangements for such employment are reasonable and fair to the Native people, if a good return is secured for the people without denying them their rights or doing them an injustice, if we feel we should hurry on the economic

²⁴ Further details on the Council are given below in the discussion of the Labour government's reform of the Colonial Office.

work which makes possible better social conditions and provisions, I can see no short-term objection to taking that course. Otherwise, we often have not the facilities, experience and the technical skill."²⁵ Thus, for example, the East African groundnut project is at present being managed by the United African Company (a Lever Brothers subsidiary). Later, as mentioned above, it will come under the control of the Overseas Food Corporation; and eventually, it is hoped, it will be transferred to the local governments.

Admirable as they seem at first glance, however, these tremendous development schemes are not meeting with unanimous approval and enthusiasm. The people of the colonies being developed in this way regard the plans with a measure of cynicism and suspicion, on the grounds that they are motivated not so much by British altruism as by British economic hardship and a desperate need for the products which the schemes will provide. "It is all very well for you to 'develop' us," the average colonial is inclined to say, "but all these plans are not for *our* benefit. They are to provide you with the things *you* need." In addition to this skepticism as to motives, Rita Hinden sees three chief reasons for this lack of enthusiasm on the part of the colonial peoples. The first is that the development schemes are entirely British—born of British imagination and planning, designed to meet purely British needs, financed by Britons, and staffed by British managers. The second is that they are concentrated on primary products and give little attention to building up a balanced economy for the colonies as a bulwark against the effects of worldwide depression. The third reason for the colonial's mistrust is his fear of what the policy of future (and possibly less beneficent) British governments may be with these new and powerful economic instruments in their hands. Colonial peoples, in short, have not given a wholehearted welcome to the development schemes.²⁶

²⁵ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

²⁶ Colonial reactions to the development schemes are discussed in Hinden, "British Designs and Colonial Doubts," in *New Statesman and Nation*, vol. 34 (November 15, 1947) p. 384.

While these far-reaching economic plans have been getting under way, there have also been advances on the political front in recent years. The most conspicuous examples, of course, have been the grants of independence to India, Burma, and Trans-Jordan. In addition, major constitutional changes have taken place in nearly all the colonies and new constitutions have been put into effect in Aden (1946), Ceylon (1946), the Gold Coast (1946), the Malay States (1946), Malta (1947), and Nigeria (1947).²⁷ The general effect of these constitutional changes has been to institute legislative assemblies or to augment the powers of those already existing, to increase the proportion of elected to appointed members in these assemblies, and to make possible greater participation of nonwhite natives in the affairs of government. Along with political advances within the individual colonies, there has been an effort to increase cooperation between the several colonies on a regional basis. In Africa, for example, a West African Council, a Central African Council, and an East African Governors' Conference have been organized to deal with subjects of common interest to the African territories, such as defense, research, aviation, food supplies, public health, and the like.²⁸ A similar development, but on an even wider scale, is the meeting to be held in London this fall of representatives from all the African colonies, which will include elected as well as official members of the several African legislative bodies. Great Britain has also held conversations with France, Belgium, and the Netherlands on common problems of colonial administration.²⁹

Corollary to the policy of preparing colonial peoples for a greater degree of self-government has been the encouragement given to trade unions in the colonies since the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940. Labor departments in the several colonies have been strengthened, colonial

²⁷ Summaries of the recent constitutional developments in all British territories may be found in Cmd. 7167, *The Colonial Empire (1939-1947)*, 1947, pp. 32-52.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

²⁹ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

labor officers have received intensive training courses in London, and there has been a phenomenal growth of unions and of union membership. While the figure for total membership has not been obtained, the Colonial Office lists 742 trade unions as of May 1947.³⁰

One criticism which has been made of this spectacular growth of colonial trade unionism is that the newly organized unions are often the direct descendants of the old secret societies which Great Britain had used its whole police force to suppress, and their methods of control often involve terror and intimidation. A second objection is that in contrast to British unions, which derived their vitality from the fact that they were fighting movements opposing the existing order, the new colonial unions have been started under official supervision and with official approval—the implication being that they may thus be subject to state control.³¹ Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that the new colonial unions, whatever their faults, do provide valuable training in democratic methods.

The Labour government has also turned its attention to reform of the Colonial Office and the Colonial Services in order to manage the various development schemes more efficiently. More than ten advisory committees and subcommittees have been organized to advise the Colonial Office on such matters as medicine, agriculture, economics, and the like. Overall supervision of the development plans has been given to a Colonial Economic and Development Council, established in 1946 "to advise the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the framing and subsequent review of plans for economic and social development in the Colonial Empire and on questions of general economic and financial policy."³² Reorganization and modernization of the existing units of the Colonial Office, however, have been hampered by lack of trained

³⁰ Cmd. 7167 (cited above) pp. 72-78.

³¹ See Graham Hough, "Colonial Policy under a Labour Government," in *New Statesman and Nation*, vol. 34 (October 11, 1947) pp. 284-85.

³² Cmd. 7167 (cited above) pp. 24, 29.

personnel, especially in the higher grades. Both to overcome this difficulty and to carry out the Labour party's avowed policy of giving colonials increased access to posts in the Colonial Office and the Colonial Service, the sum of 1 million pounds from the Colonial Development and Welfare fund has been earmarked for scholarships to train colonial candidates for these posts. An additional 1.5 million pounds from the same fund has been set aside to give selected candidates (whether selected in the colonies, the dominions, or the United Kingdom) specialized training in colonial subjects.³³

Because of the great press of other business connected with Britain's reconstruction and economic difficulties, little has been done to improve the relations between Parliament and the Colonial Office or to increase Parliamentary supervision of colonial affairs. This lack of coordination, as well as Parliamentary indifference to colonial problems, is reflected in the fact that the House of Commons has witnessed only one major debate on colonial affairs (that of July 9, 1946) since Labour's advent to power.³⁴ The Standing Committee on Colonial Affairs whose institution was recommended in 1942, as was mentioned above, has not been appointed.

Impressive as all the developmental schemes are, however, their scope is still not wide enough to satisfy the Labour government entirely. It is ironic that when for the first time Great Britain has a government that sincerely wishes to carry out a thoroughgoing development of the colonies for the benefit of their peoples she should be hampered by economic difficulties of her own. A really complete program of colonial development and reform would require the expenditure of resources which Britain simply cannot

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 26. See also *Hansard*, July 9, 1946 (425 H. C. Deb. 5 s., col. 252).

³⁴ Shorter periods, however, have been devoted to various isolated aspects of colonial policy: on July 25, 1946 (colonial estimates for the Malay States); March 24, 1947 (Empire trade); July 29, 1947 (colonial estimates); August 5, 1947 (colonial Empire manpower); October 21, 1947 (the King's speech); November 6, 1947 (Overseas Resources Development Bill); November 21, 1947 (Ceylon Independence Bill); and December 5, 1947 (Mandated and Trust Territories Bill).

spare from her own reconstruction needs. The only funds available from the British government are those already authorized by the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. More cannot be had. In addition, the colonies themselves face a vicious circle of financial difficulties stemming from the fact that the general level of education must be raised in order to increase local revenues, while increased local revenues are needed in order to provide greater educational facilities. A further hindrance lies in the fact that Britain is short not only of money but of resources of all kinds—including human resources. Many material necessities are still in short supply and, in addition, trained technicians and administrators are scarce. Ideally, the shortage of trained personnel could be overcome by increased use of natives; but the latter must first be adequately trained, and training is difficult when the funds available for education are limited. The various shortages in men, money, and goods thus interact to aggravate each other and to retard the kind and extent of colonial development that the Labour government might hope for.

IV

What conclusions, then, can be drawn from this inquiry into British colonial policy? Have there been any fundamental changes in that policy as a result of the change in governments in 1945? What, exactly, has the Labour government accomplished that sets its approach to colonial affairs apart from that of its predecessors in office?

At the start, it must be admitted that some very definite advances have been made by the Labour government—in both the economic and political fields. The economic schemes which have been initiated, while they have been hampered by lack of resources and by a certain want of enthusiasm on the part of the colonial peoples, nevertheless can be expected eventually to produce profound and beneficial changes in colonial economies. Are they, however, socialist schemes, unmistakably Labourite in their conception and execution? The fact that the development schemes

are financed in large part by state funds and that many of them are directly controlled by the government might lead one at first to say that they are entirely Labourite in character. It must be remembered, however, that the present colonial development plans were authorized by, and the overwhelmingly greater part of the funds for their operation were provided by, the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945, both of which were introduced by a Coalition government with a Conservative Colonial Secretary. Is it not safe to assume, then, that the present colonial development schemes would have been planned and carried out even if a Conservative government had been returned to power in July 1945? "But," Labour's advocate might reply, "the Labour government has entered into the development schemes envisioned by the two Acts more enthusiastically and wholeheartedly than a Conservative government would have. Labour's idealism and its natural sympathy for the colonial peoples has led it to carry out the spirit of the Acts where the Conservatives would have been content to fulfil their letter." This, unfortunately for our purposes, is an assertion that can never be either affirmed or denied. The best one can do is to accept or reject its substance on the basis of personal sentiment and conviction.

Much the same sort of scrutiny can be applied to the political advances of the past few years. Are they truly socialist in character or would they have taken place even under a Conservative government? In this instance, again, it cannot be denied that definite advances have been made. India, Burma, and Trans-Jordan have been freed; new constitutions have been granted to many colonies; and liberal constitutional changes have taken place in nearly all of them. Do these changes, however, represent a completely new policy toward the colonies or merely a continuation and acceleration of previous trends? A logical case, for example, can be made for the viewpoint that the granting of independence to India was merely the culmination of a long-standing policy. In announcing the transfer of power to Indian

hands Prime Minister Atlee declared: "It has long been the policy of successive British Governments to work towards the realisation of self-government in India. . . . His Majesty's Government believe this to have been right and in accordance with sound democratic principles. Since they came into office, they have done their utmost to carry it forward to its fulfillment."³⁵ Certainly the principle of self-government for India had long been accepted by Great Britain, as evidenced by extensions of local self-government and successive constitutional reforms beginning as early as 1861 with the India Councils Act and culminating with the Government of India Act of 1935. Labour's distinctive contribution seems to have been an acceptance of the fact that the British regime could not continue much longer and a clear realization that the time had come for the granting of complete independence. Similarly, it can be asserted that the constitutional reforms in the colonies represent not a radical change in British colonial policy but merely an extension of the policy of earlier governments. Certainly the principle of trusteeship, generally accepted by all British governments since the beginning of the century, called for the granting of progressively more liberal constitutions to the colonies. Furthermore, the majority of the recent constitutional reforms were granted in fulfilment of promises made to the colonies during the war by the Coalition government. Would not similar reforms have been made by a Conservative government? Here again it can at least be suggested that possibly Labour has acted with greater idealism and altruism than might have motivated a Conservative government in its dealing with colonial political problems. Certainly Churchill's famous dictum that he had not become the King's first minister in order to oversee the liquidation of the British Empire, as well as the anguished cries of protest with which he and other Conservative leaders greeted the announcements of independence for India and Burma, lends credibility to the suggestion.

Since there seems to be substantial agreement between Conserva-

³⁵ *Hansard*, February 20, 1947 (433 H. C. Deb. 5 s., col. 1395).

tive and Labourite positions on colonial matters, perhaps a distinction can be made by saying that while both groups advocate large-scale colonial development the Conservatives now favor economic rather than political development and Labour favors advances in the political field. Following Labour's report to Parliament on colonial affairs in 1946, for instance, Colonel Stanley, the last Conservative Colonial Secretary declared: "I feel . . . that in the next few years the greatest emphasis in Colonial development should not be on the political, but on the social and economic side. I feel we have a much bigger leeway to catch up there, than we have merely in relation to the machinery of government."³⁶ At first thought, this may seem to be a complete contradiction of the two parties' traditional policies. The explanation lies in the fact that the Conservatives are now willing to support planned economic development in the colonies because of Britain's acute need for the products of such development, while at the same time they deplore the speed with which Labour has granted increased self-government or outright independence to many British possessions.

Labour's uneasy recognition of the many similarities between its colonial program and those of the preceding governments is revealed by the fact that it defends itself against the charge. For example, Labour's Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Arthur Creech Jones, declared before a public meeting in London in December 1946: "There may appear some continuity in some respects with the work of earlier governments, but that is testimony of the success of our propaganda over the past few generations. I think you will find, in any case, that the Labour Government is not only more energetic and imaginative, that it places more emphasis on human considerations and the rights of the colonial peoples, that its pace is faster and its conceptions of development broader, but also that it is clearer in its line of action."³⁷ Whether these assertions are true, and also whether

³⁶ *Hansard*, July 9, 1946 (425 H. C. Deb. 5 s., col. 265).

³⁷ Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

recent colonial reforms have been motivated by idealism or by economic necessity, can never be decided with any certainty. Since there are no radical differences between the colonial policies of the Labour government and its predecessors, since there are so many similarities, and since the question of motives can never be definitely settled, perhaps the most we can say in conclusion is that the real change in British colonial policy occurred not in 1945 with the election of the Labour government but five years earlier with the passage of the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act. Labour's election, in other words, has made little radical difference in British colonial policy.

(Princeton, N. J.)

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POWER AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

A Definition of Politics

BY LUDWIG FREUND

"THE social scientist has a role to play which is just as vital for the continued growth of civilization as that of the atomic scientist, the physician, or the industrial producer. But if he is to play his role effectively, he cannot content himself with mere presentation of 'facts' on both sides of every question—a procedure which . . . the late Carl Becker described as 'the best substitute for ideas yet invented.' Objectivity is not . . . abstention from judgment about competing values, but honest consideration of all available evidence by one who makes allowances for his possible prejudices before arriving at value judgments. Otherwise so-called objectivity could easily degenerate into intellectual nihilism, which is tantamount to betrayal of the function of the social scientist in a democratic society."¹ With these words the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* made one of the strongest pleas for the social or political philosopher that has been voiced in recent years. According to this statement, the political theorist obviously must have two qualifications: (1) the courage to penetrate beyond the area of given facts, and (2) complete intellectual honesty in weighing facts and reaching conclusions.

While hardly anyone is in a position to measure the differentials of intellectual honesty, the "available evidence" on which conclusions are based can be judged by experts, and the degree of scholarship, that is, of honest academic effort spent in elaborating a theory, can be determined. The plea quoted above is not the only voice, albeit one of the more articulate and urbane ones, to complain subtly of the lack of philosophic depth, honesty, and

¹ *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, vol. 26, no. 14 (January 17, 1947) p. 2.

courage in the political and social discussion of these vital days. There is hardly a social scientist who has not occasionally heard some criticism of his field for its abundance of facts with which no one but the intellectually undisciplined radio commentator or syndicated columnist seems to know what to do. If "intellectual nihilism" is not to be the result, it would seem that the social scientist must afford the courage to lead beyond the "facts" and to do so with all the academic equipment and responsibility at his disposal.

The Basic Concept of Political Science

With the very first step into the field of political science, it becomes apparent how careful the political scientists have been to avoid "judgments" and to shun "ideas." Whereas a great body of classic literature in the field has been devoted to the task of defining the field itself,² the activity around which the science was built—namely, politics—has, astonishingly enough, been defined with niggardliness and reserve. Apparently the academic person feels himself on safe ground when he explains his own academic pursuits, but fears to become, or to be accused of being, dogmatic if he philosophizes on the facts and sentiments which he shares with the "vulgus."

Politics—as distinct from political science—has finally come to have a popular meaning in this country, which is completely dissociated from any precise content. Some writers have added to the

² The great Swiss, Johann Bluntschli, in his monumental *Lehre vom modernen Staat*, vol. 3, "Politik" (Stuttgart 1876) pp. 1-6 (Oxford translation, 1892, pp. 1-5), distinguished between politics as an art (*Staatskunst*) and politics as a science (*Staatswissenschaft*): the former has to do with the practical guidance of the state, whereas the latter is concerned with the nature and origins of the state, its forms, rules, laws, and development. Franz von Holtzendorff, in his *Prinzipien der Politik* (Berlin 1879) chs. 2 and 3, Georg Jellinek, in *Recht des modernen Staates* (Berlin 1905) p. 13, and Westal W. Willoughby, in *The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law* (New York 1925) p. 7, observed this distinction. So did Burgess in the United States, Bryce and Seeley in England, von Treitschke and von Mohl in Germany. Innumerable authors have subsequently elaborated on the theme of politics as a science, whereas the treatment of politics as an art—in other words, politics in action—has been relatively and conspicuously simple, if not single-minded.

confusion by abiding too closely by the German identification of *Politik* with *Staatskunst*, and by reserving the term "politics" for "the agencies, the instrumentalities, and the results associated with the initial, i.e. policy forming, stage of governmental activity. Politics is one-half of government. The other part is administration."³ This identification with statecraft is obviously too narrow an explanation, for it neglects the struggles of groups and individuals outside the government for the protection or ascendancy of their respective interests and ideas.

I am inclined to agree with Marshall Dimock, who complains that "no precise meaning of the word 'politics' can be said to exist at present." Yet, he notes with what appears to be considerable distress the existence of a popular notion of politics, which he disposes of as "corrupt," and concerning which he remarks that perhaps the less said about it the better.⁴ Here is exactly where I am inclined to think the source of the trouble lies. The "corrupt" meaning of the word "politics" is by no means entirely and exclusively a "vulgar" one. And certain questions may logically arise. If the political scientists are not going to clear the atmosphere of intellectual confusion and misunderstanding concerning their subject matter, then who can? And if the political scientists refuse to assume responsibility for the term "politics," then who is supposed to discharge this obligation?⁵

The Association of Power and Politics

The quest of political scientists for the meaning of politics has found a surprisingly unanimous answer, and its nature is such that

³ Marshall E. Dimock, *Modern Politics and Administration* (New York 1937) p. 21.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁵ In this context, it may be significant that Erik Reger, one of the leading liberal minds of postwar Germany, blames the familiar German saying, "Die Politik verdirbt den Charakter" ("Politics corrupts the mind") for many of the Germans' troubles in politics ("Politik als Schicksal," in *Berliner Almanach 1947*, p. 115). Those who kept aloof from politics because they were shocked by some of its expressions nevertheless became a significant negative factor in politics. Their remoteness played indirectly into the hands of the demagogue who aspired to become the supreme lord of Germany, Europe, and possibly the world. Political scientists who think the less said on "dirty" politics the better should take heed.

it should be no shock that the popular notion of politics is far from complimentary to politicians. Coker still attributed the idea of power and coercion in government and politics to imperialistic, nationalistic, militaristic, and authoritarian sources, and that of violent revolution to fascism, communism, and other "extremes of opinion."⁶ But when he published his summary of political thought from Karl Marx to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Merriam's treatise, *Political Power* (New York 1934), had already appeared. Two years earlier, Niebuhr's *Moral Man and Immoral Society, A Study in Ethics and Politics* (New York 1932) had ushered in a theological as well as philosophical approach to the problems of society and politics, which to some persons seemed cruelly realistic. Since then there has developed a long list of publications which seem to agree on the thesis that "power is the fundamental concept in social sciences in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in Physics."⁷ In fact, this thesis appears to be the political scientists' nearest approximation to a definition of politics. It is, of course, in no way as "new" as Bertrand Russell proclaimed it to be. It is as old as Machiavelli, and has since been revived in manifold forms. We may disregard Comte's concept of "order through force," reiterated by Marx, Taine, Barrès, Maurras, Pareto, Sorel, and Lenin; we may dismiss the worship of power by Nietzsche and Spengler, and the role of power in the extensive literature concerned with the social application of the Darwinian school of thought. But even so liberal a mind as Max Weber could profess that "politics . . . means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power; either among states or among groups within a state."⁸

Similar definitions of politics have become current among political scientists and social theorists, even within democracies.

⁶ Francis W. Coker, *Recent Political Thought* (New York 1934) ch. 16, "Political Authority by Force," pp. 443-51.

⁷ Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis* (New York 1938) p. 12.

⁸ Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in *Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Munich 1921) p. 398; a translation by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, entitled "Politics as a Vocation," is included in *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York 1946) p. 78.

"The key to world politics is found in an understanding of the eternal and ceaseless search for power."⁹ "Politics is the quest for power, and political relationships are power relationships, actual or potential . . . political action . . . has always been more violent than peaceful . . . its purpose is frequently not to harmonize conflicting interests but to achieve domination, to gain control of state power. . . . This is true not only in the dictatorships but also in democracies, and especially in international relations, since war is one of the techniques of achieving or maintaining power . . . politics embraces every social phenomenon characterized by the struggles of groups or individuals to gain or retain power or influence over others. . . . A person has influence over other persons through his wishes or advice. But he has power in so far as he is able to determine their behavior through his orders, even against their wishes."¹⁰

In the minds of these authors who lean heavily on the concept of power, the state is an arena in which numerous interest groups are struggling, all seeking favors from the state, all of them trying, "in varying degrees," to influence the exercise of state power. "Either all groups must yield in part or one or more must give way wholly to the others," says Roucek.¹¹

The display of the "awful truth of politics" is so unequivocal and direct that one who has seen totalitarianism in operation cannot help asking himself what, in the minds of these theorists, is the difference between a tyranny and a democracy. Niebuhr,

⁹ Thorsten V. Kalijarvi et al., *Modern World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York 1945) p. 4.

¹⁰ Roy V. Peel, Joseph S. Roucek, et al., *Introduction to Politics* (New York 1941) p. 5.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9. Niebuhr argues in a similar vein (*op. cit.*, pp. 231, 232, also ch. 8). See also Percy E. Corbett, "Power and Justice," in *Peace, Security and the United Nations*, ed. by Hans J. Morgenthau (Chicago 1946) pp. 15-16; G. E. G. Catlin, *The Science and Method of Politics* (New York 1927) parts 2 and 3, and *A Study of the Principles of Politics* (New York 1930) chs. 1 and 3; Carl L. Becker, *How New Will the Better World Be?* (New York 1944) pp. 79-84; Hans J. Morgenthau, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* (Chicago 1946). There are many others too numerous to mention, who support the concept of power as the central one in politics.

surely one of the most profound social analysts of our time, suggests the answer in his assertion that "an adjustment is possible only through a rational check upon self-interest and a rational comprehension of the interests of others. . . . Nothing but an extension of social intelligence and an increase in moral goodwill can offer society a permanent solution." But the moralist, unhappily, does not always recognize "the elements of injustice and coercion which are present in any contemporary social peace," because the coercive elements are "covert." They may appear in the forms of economic power, propaganda, "the traditional processes of governments," and "other types of non-violent power." Thus, according to Niebuhr, democracy's justice is only different in form or degree from the tyrant's injustice.¹²

This reasoning is likely to confirm Mosca's contention that, whatever the appearances to the contrary, an "organized minority imposes its will on the disorganized majority," under the representative system no less than any other. "In elections, as in all other manifestations of social life, those who have the will and, especially, the moral, intellectual and material *means* to force their will upon others take the lead over the others and command them."¹³ Since Mosca's statement, convictions with reference to the essence of democracy and representative government do not seem to have changed sufficiently to reveal a significant feature whereby it would be possible to distinguish democracy from tyranny in terms of the intrinsic nature of their politics rather than the outward structures of their governments. I, for one, suppose that a deep-seated distinction that is more than structural must exist, though apparently the elements that compose it are not nearly so unequivocal and distinct as is the element of power in politics. Nor have they found similar definition in the prevailing academic literature on the meaning of politics.

¹² Niebuhr, *op cit.*, pp. 232-33.

¹³ Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, trans. by Hannah D. Kahn (New York 1939) p. 154. Other writers consider the ballot "a means of expressing the force of the majority"; see Kalijarvi et al., *op. cit.*, p. 5. Kalijarvi contends, nevertheless, that "the democratic process is really only another manifestation of power."

The Reality of Power

It would be pointless to deny that the element of power in politics, even in what is vaguely known as democratic politics, is real. This is particularly true of international relations, an area in which Spykman,¹⁴ Lippmann,¹⁵ and Strausz-Hupé¹⁶ have done notable work in breaching the dam of long-standing liberal self-deceptions in the United States, though it is perhaps to be admitted that Spykman had a tendency to apply the geopolitical principles too freely. The extensive, erudite modern literature on sovereignty, from Hugo Krabbe to Merriam, supports their point of view.

The inevitability of what is called "power politics" emerges from the inexorable fact of the "nation states system," which necessarily transforms national policies into strategies for the purpose of achieving security or maintaining power and prosperity. Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny have cited certain fitting examples from the years of World War I and the period immediately thereafter to prove this point.¹⁷ An examination of conditions following World War II discloses no facts that would indicate any substantial progress from the situation existing after the earlier war, which is summarized as follows: "On the one hand, they [the nations] have indulged in an incredible multiplication of the instruments for insuring peace, but on the other hand they have consistently rejected all responsibility for employing these instruments where their own interests were not advantaged."¹⁸

In 1947, three Latin-American nations ignored a United Nations resolution aimed at Spain, and Argentina openly flouted it. Obviously, so long as the big powers disagree among each other and so

¹⁴ Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York 1942), and his posthumous work, *The Geography of the Peace*, ed. by H. R. Nicholl (New York 1944).

¹⁵ Walter Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (New York 1943).

¹⁶ Robert Strausz-Hupé, *The Balance of Tomorrow* (New York 1945).

¹⁷ *The Great Powers in World Politics* (New York 1939) pp. 24-26.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

long as they abuse certain of their privileges in the Security Council and elsewhere, there is no reason for the smaller nations to take the UN more seriously. On the contrary, disagreement among the great powers makes it possible for the smaller states to challenge the UN's authority with reasonable prospect of impunity. And why do the big powers disagree? Whatever the immediate causes of their difference are, the great and overshadowing single cause is well known to be the persistent pursuit of "their own interests," which are uppermost in their statesmen's as well as the people's minds.

How can a sufficient amount of justice be expected to arise from such a condition to insure a reduced emphasis on self-interest and power in international affairs? Many writers on the subject either project their hopes into the vague and distant future, thus blocking all intelligent and empiric discussion of the problem; or they blame mankind in general and statesmen in particular for the lack of intelligence and moral fortitude shown in their failure to bring about the millenium which it is so easy to conceive. The latter approach yields no more practical results than the former. Percy E. Corbett's corollary that "the alleged community of states is an analogy, imperfect as analogies always are, from the national community," is very convincing. The widespread inclination to ascribe the shortcomings of the international scene to the primitive character of the so-called family of nations Corbett dismisses by pointing out that "a striking characteristic of primitive, as contrasted with civilized, communities is the greater uniformity of their standards and conduct." Past and present experience in no way refutes his further contention that "the tendency of the individual to identify justice with his own needs or desires" is multiplied "in those groups which we call nations or states." It is a patriotic habit to make a virtue of national selfishness.¹⁹

I cannot help thinking that in this particular realm of politics we must accept the rules of what Max Weber called an "ethic of responsibility"—that is, an ethic which considers the ultimate as

¹⁹ Corbett, *op cit.*, pp. 15, 16.

well as the immediate consequences of political action, in preference to a politically less responsible, but "absolute," ethical code.²⁰ With this perspective, one must respect the views of the experts on international relations and law, who are almost unanimous in warning against broad generalizations which cannot be brought into harmony with the facts of international life. James Bryce cited as first among the limitations of sovereignty the "rights and powers of other states."²¹ Edwin D. Dickinson formulated the distinction between the equality of states "before the law" and "equality of capacity for rights."²² The former is indispensable in the international society, according to Dickinson. The latter is at best an ideal. "There have always been and probably will be for some time to come many states constrained to accept the more or less permanent protection, guaranty, neutralization or financial supervision of other states."²³ This view is necessarily inconsistent with the moralist's dream of a world community based on a complete equality of states. But it requires no explanation for political scientists to recognize that this is a realistic concept of power, and that "inequality of capacity for rights" reduces political equality, as distinct from legal equality.

This legal equality Dickinson cherished dearly. In the light of postwar developments, particularly in view of the double legal standards favoring the Big Three or Big Five, it becomes increasingly doubtful, however, whether this differentiation between legal and political equality is more than a *façon de parler*. The legal equality enjoyed by China and France bestows upon them certain distinct political advantages, which are not in any way commensurate with their "capacity for rights." On the other hand, it seems reasonable to expect that their lag in "capacity for

²⁰ Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-27.

²¹ Bryce, "The Nature of Sovereignty," in his *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, vol. 2 (Oxford 1901) pp. 510 ff.

²² Dickinson, *The Equality of States in International Law*, Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Mass., 1920), and "Equality of States," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 5, pp. 580-82.

²³ Dickinson, "Equality of States" (cited above) p. 581.

rights" will tend eventually to undermine their political status in the councils of the great powers.

It has already been mentioned that the role of power in *domestic* affairs may be covert. Nevertheless, it is there, and it is effective. The multifarious pressure groups and the political parties are its most vociferous expression. According to Roucek, the political party is "a spontaneous organization of propaganda and militant agitation seeking to acquire power within its state for its leaders and thus also spiritual and material benefits for its followers. The fruits of political power are economic advantage, social prestige and security."²⁴ Little, if anything, can be added to this definition after an empirical survey of the situation.

It is to be considered that the state has come to claim the monopoly of coercive power in its attempt to enforce lawful behavior on the part of the citizens. The emphasis here is upon the word "claim," for there are forms of power and of indirect coercion which are outside the state.²⁵ An important point is that economic power is not the only effective power in the private spheres of life. Creeds, demagoguery, strong-arm methods marshalled and used by varied groups, all demonstrate that the wealthy class does not necessarily enjoy a monopoly of "covert" coercion. Nor has the state succeeded in monopolizing the sum total of the instruments of power, as Roucek,²⁶ Weber²⁷ and many others assume. Compromise has therefore come to be the primary means by which the democratic state strives to insure internal peace and balance between rival interests and powers.

Political Objectives Beyond Power

It is difficult to believe that the prevailing emphasis on power in the literary interpretation of politics does justice to all the

²⁴ Peel, Roucek, et. al., *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁵ In this connection, see Bertrand Russell, *op cit.*, chs. 4, 6-10, on priestly power, some of the manifestations of naked power, revolutionary power, economic power, power over opinion, creeds as sources of power.

²⁶ Peel, Roucek, et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 8-12.

²⁷ Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-79.

factual elements and aspects of the subject. Government, as the top echelon of political activity, is not only to be conceived as a ruling agency, but also as one that serves the people. At least, this has always been the democratic concept of government.

If power and the exclusive pursuit of national self-interest fully explained the *foreign* policies of nations—as Maurras, the father of French “integral nationalism,” said they should—then the relief work of nations in behalf of others could not be *completely* understood. The care for displaced persons and refugees, and the loans, credits, and subsidies granted to suffering nations could not be entirely explained. True, some economic or strategic interest or motive has frequently been associated with these actions. The power element is inherent in nearly all political manifestations. But I maintain that other interests, such as service, love of peace, cooperation, even moral considerations, are also often present in international dealings, even though they are all too frequently overshadowed by the mighty power interest. How strong the moral urge and the interest in peace *can* be was demonstrated by the unsuccessful appeasement policy of the Hitler period, when Britain and France continuously sacrificed certain advantages in their power position, from their toleration of the military occupation of the Rhineland to the rape of Czechoslovakia. Their policy may be termed short-sighted, and it was near-fatal. Nevertheless, it had the earmarks of a legitimate foreign policy, even though it lacked force and shirked a resort to power when the well-timed application of power might have easily solved the problem of Hitler. We may even admit the possibility that the appeasement policy might have succeeded, had a lesser megalomaniac than Hitler been its target.

While the power factor in these particular areas of international affairs is still pervasive, even when it is ostensibly neglected, it becomes less convincing if one approaches the problems of the pooling of interstate resources; the international postal, traffic, drug, health and labor conventions; the varied concessions that great powers make to smaller states and peoples—for example, the

British withdrawals from Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, and the United States evacuation of bases in Panama; the formation of such international bodies as UNESCO. There may be elements of wisdom and prestige involved in any one of these phenomena, but the element of power politics is certainly reduced to a minimum. (I am ready to defend this statement, though even UNESCO has not been spared occasional conversion into a propaganda rostrum by the emissaries of totalitarian rulers.)

A significant point is that the present international alignment, the exigencies of self-defense, and the desire for peace and security have combined to force upon the United States a new role. This role is contingent upon her postwar position as the leading champion of Western democratic tradition. Though some of our politicians may not see it that way, the specific function of the United States in the new international struggle for security and, possibly, for survival, is to pledge and practice international good will and cooperation in contradistinction to the unashamed pursuit of power politics. International good will and cooperation, in the face of threatened force, revolution, and minority despotism, constitute the potential virtues and attractions of democratic world politics. And if, on the basis of such cooperation, a measure of economic security can be attained by suffering nations, while we succeed in retaining most of our own standards, international cooperation and good will may be said to have scored a telling victory over blunt power politics. At this stage of national as well as of international developments, it is not at all certain that the United States government and people will be permitted to play out the role that the historic moment seems to have prescribed for them. There can be little doubt, however, that if fate or their own shortcomings do not prevent them from living up to their great tasks, the character of international relations may be permanently affected by the success of this novel approach to world politics.

It is in *domestic* affairs, however, that the idea of service over and against that of rule and power has scored its greatest triumphs.

Again, the "ruling" element cannot be dispensed with, but the evidence of service is so overwhelming that one cannot but be surprised at the scant recognition it has received in current definitions of politics.

For us moderns it is only natural to assume that the primary function of the politician is to serve. If this were not the case, all the indignation called forth by the phenomenon of Hitlerism would have been ill-founded. Political power in the modern age can and should be no more than a means for service. We are in accord with Dimock's analysis of this part of the question: "Although power, control, and coercion have been symbolic of the state's development . . . the services of government have tended to increase so enormously in number and in importance that the control aspect of government appears less impressive in comparison."²⁸ He continues: "What a libel on human nature it is to say that the basic fact about man's political activities is that he seeks position and power! It is to be doubted whether more than an infinitesimal proportion of the people of the country desire dominance and authority."²⁹ Here, I am afraid, Dimock overshoots his mark by underestimating the vigor and scope of the power instinct in "political man." The record, however, speaks for itself: the state, and therefore the politician, has—within a range of variability—performed the basic function of the defense of the community against outside enemies, and the maintenance of a semblance of peace internally. The state, furthermore, "watches over family relations, interferes between parents and children, and between man and wife; it attempts to control gambling, drinking and extra-legal sex relations. The Universities have fallen to the state; so have the hospitals, infirmaries, orphan asylums and homes for the aged. Even charity has become a function of the state on a large scale, and the poor, the weak, the halt and the blind, once the concern of the church, have now become a special province for the exercise of those efficiencies and skills that come under

²⁸ Dimock, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

the heading of a 'Department of Public Welfare'." ³⁰ Last, but not least, the state has fostered arts, communications, industrial relations, trade, and the like. Apparently, the politician who strives for power cannot, after he attains it, ignore the service feature inherent in government and politics.

A Tentative Definition of "Politics"

A definition may now be attempted which, with all due respect for the realities of power politics, also includes the element of service. It should place the emphasis correctly by assigning the *purpose* of democratic politics to its proper rank by giving it precedence over the *means* of power. Lack of such emphasis aids the perversion of political expression.

In attempting this definition, I do not claim either originality or finality of thought. The academic literature abounds in hints to the effect that politics is more than power,³¹ which makes it all the more amazing that the simple further step of incorporating the additional meaning in definitions of the activity has not been

³⁰ Frank Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power in Society," in *Political Science Quarterly* (December 1946) pp. 486-87.

³¹ See, for example, Niebuhr, *op. cit.*: "An adequate political morality must do justice to the insights of both moralists and political realists. It will recognize that human society will probably never escape social conflict, *even though it extends the area of cooperation*. . . . A rational society will probably place a *greater emphasis upon the ends and purposes* for which coercion is used than upon the elimination of coercion and conflict" (pp. 233-34; italics mine). In *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York 1944), Niebuhr explains: "Of these three [the United States, Britain and Russia] Russia will have the greatest difficulty in establishing inner moral checks upon its will-to-power," the reasons for her deficiency being her "simple religion and culture" which makes self-criticism more difficult than usual, and her lack of constitutional checks upon her politicians (p. 183).

Of the contemporary writers on the general subject, I believe that Dimock has been one of the most outspoken in his criticism of the traditional concepts of politics. He stresses the need for "a more complete analysis of political motivation and behavior" (*op. cit.* p. 12). Unfortunately, he does not furnish us with a satisfactory definition of the term and finally admits that "no precise meaning of the word 'politics' can be said to exist at present" (p. 21). In defining *political science*, however, he states earlier in the same text that it "deals with the fulfillment of men's wants by means of public, i.e., political instrumentalities" (p. 8). Again, one cannot help being surprised at the fact that Dimock hesitated to apply this formula to the field of politics itself.

taken. My proposed definition is simple. It is based on what has implicitly been recognized as politics by more than one writer in the field, and on what has been associated in the popular mind with its purposes and ends, regardless of certain corrupt admixtures which have penetrated the popular notion through the channels of workaday experience or perverted emphasis.

Using the service feature as a starting point, the first assumption is as follows:

The correlate of "service" is "interest." It is in the public interest that the politician is supposed to render service. A politically relevant interest is constituted by anything that is needed, wanted, or desired by a publicly relevant group. At this point of the analysis there arise a number of problems which are typical of any political debate. What does "public" or "publicly relevant" mean? What is the difference between "needs," "wants," and "desires"? Where is the place of the individual in this analysis? Is it not true that, in democratic politics, the "individual interest" takes precedence over "public interest"?

Let us, then, state that we may regard as "public" anything that concerns a large enough number of people to warrant attention by government or by those who attempt to influence or direct government, that is, the politicians. For example, if an individual is dissatisfied with a given tax burden, with his condition of unemployment, the type of politicians who represent him, or any other single phenomenon of the body politic, this dissatisfaction in itself does not necessarily pose a political problem. If, however, a large number of people all over the nation begin to grumble seriously about taxes, if crippling strike waves hit the national economy, if threats of rebellion appear among masses of unemployed, or large-scale movements for better government get under way—any one of these conditions will necessarily attract governmental attention for numerous reasons. The prime one of these reasons is founded on the government function of service, which is closely connected with the government interest in the maintenance of domestic peace and order. Among other potent, though sec-

ondary, reasons may be found the government interest in self-perpetuation and continuance in power. Obviously, a government unable to attain the primary objective, namely, the maintenance of peace and order in the community, will not long remain in power. Incidentally, the question of what constitutes a large enough (or important enough) group gives rise to the possibility of discussion and the formation of "political opinions" in individual contingencies.

The individual enters into this picture only in so far as he is a publicly important figure. If he represents a large enough group his views and actions are politically relevant; otherwise they are not. I am afraid that a few writers and commentators, in overplaying the consideration for the anonymous individual in democratic societies, have become victims of the fascist interpretation of democratic politics. Fascist propagandists liked to contrast their grandiose slogan, "The Individual for the State," with their distorted and arbitrary analysis of a democratic-liberal society, which they chose to portray as completely chaotic, and with the liberal slogan, which they asserted to be "The State for the Individual." Any military conscript, or taxpayer, or, especially, any violator of the law, if no one else, knows that this slogan does not truthfully represent the way in which our society operates.

The distinction between public "needs," "wants," and "desires" may be drawn as follows. A public *need* is a necessity imposed by circumstances or pertinent facts. Its satisfaction is vital to the group or to an important section of it, regardless of whether the members of the group are aware of its urgency or not. A public *want* is a necessity, the satisfaction of which is demanded or consciously striven for by the group. A public *desire* is the longing or striving on the part of the group, or an important section thereof, for an object or a situation the realization of which would not constitute a vital necessity.

A possible point of discussion arises with reference to the first of these terms. Are democratic politicians supposed to serve public needs? In other words, can they, as representatives of the

people, strive for the satisfaction of certain necessities which they recognize as such while the majority of their electorate do not acknowledge these necessities? Still more bluntly, are they justified in satisfying public needs, if the people do not want this satisfaction? This question aims at the heart of the democratic process and the intrinsic problem of leadership in a democracy. It cannot be solved within the limits of our special discussion.³²

With a clarification of terms behind us, we may proceed to the actual definition. "Politics" signifies those activities which aim at the satisfaction of public wants (needs) and desires. A conspicuous feature of this definition is its kinship to that of "economics." In fact, political economy has, in the minds of many, taken the place of political science. The *material* wants and desires upon which the economist focuses his attention, however, are not representative of the motivations of the *entire* body politic. Moral, religious, and cultural values may have as immediate a relation to politics as have broad economic issues. The power element in creeds, propaganda, and indoctrination may create pertinent problems in society, and if they influence the behavior of a large enough number of people they will necessarily attract the attention of government and politicians. The moral health of a nation is as much a concern of the politician as is its physical prosperity. The fact that consideration of the latter has

³² It may be noted that Frank V. Cantwell states in "Public Opinion and the Legislative Process," in *American Political Science Review* (October 1946) p. 933: "Public opinion cannot propose a course of action, and a healthy public opinion requires leadership. . . . It is characteristic of public opinion that it cannot generate a proposal or series of proposals serving to satisfy its needs. Public opinion can indicate very powerfully the general area of its needs, but it remains for an individual or group of individuals to come forward with specific proposals." He continues (p. 935): "Those legislators who waited in the hope that public opinion would show them the way were waiting in vain. Public opinion in a democracy responds to leadership, and needs the stimulus of leadership in order to crystallize one way or the other on specific proposals." I feel that Cantwell has presented very well the subtle interrelationship of the leaders and the led in the workings of a legislative process. The "needs" as recognized by the legislators must be specified so that public opinion may express itself and formulate its "wants" and "desires." The problem as such involves many more aspects of a legal as well as sociological nature.

been uppermost in the average politician's mind, to the frequent exclusion of the former, does not alter the basic principle, the truth of which, I am inclined to think, is self-evident to all who are not completely absorbed in economic determinism.

The place of power in this definition is clear. Power has been proved to be a means of achieving satisfactions for the body politic. Since it is found empirically to be the indispensable prerequisite for a healthy community, it would appear to be also one of the public needs or wants. It is by no means the be-all and end-all of politics.

Summary

I have tried to prove that politics may have a variety of objectives. The general identification of power with politics presents a dangerous oversimplification. The ancestry of this one-sided emphasis is disquieting and should give little comfort to either politicians or political theorists in a democracy. Furthermore, the identification tends to "legalize" perverted political ideas and practices. The pragmatist viewpoint that the choice of "the least evil" is the optimum of moral judgment attainable in politics³³ may unfortunately still be true of international as well as intranational politics. This sweeping generalization should not be permitted to circulate as the sole legitimate analysis of the essence and end of politics, for it is inclined to make a virtue of a wholly unsatisfactory situation. Democratic politics may, at least from one liberal-analytical perspective, be viewed as a process which balances the power in the hands of the magistrates by the supplementary ideal of service.

³³ Morgenthau, *Scientific Man* . . . (cited above) especially chs. 6-8.

HEIDEGGER: PROBLEM AND BACKGROUND OF EXISTENTIALISM

BY KARL LOWITH

*Die Heimatlosigkeit wird ein Welt-
schicksal. Darum ist es nötig, dieses
Geschick seingeschichtlich zu denk-
en.*—Martin Heidegger

THE basic works of existentialism have not yet been translated. What is generally known about the subject is derived from many secondary channels and from articles about a new philosophy, allegedly of "nihilism," but not from a knowledge of the sources. Moreover, political circumstances play such a role in the selection of, and attention to, contemporary literature and philosophy that the average American student knows more about Jean-Paul Sartre than about Karl Jaspers, and more about Jaspers than about Martin Heidegger of whom Sartre was a pupil. This sequence in the degree of familiarity is politically conditioned, for Sartre is a Frenchman who was engaged in the resistance movement, and Jaspers a German who for ten lonely years was barred from academic activity by the Nazis, while Heidegger, who supported National Socialism in 1933, neither resisted the regime subsequently nor was dismissed from his post during its period of domination.

Since 1945 the fortunes of Jaspers and Heidegger have changed considerably. Jaspers has for the time being the unenviable distinction of being placed in the limelight of the German academic scene, while Heidegger has had to retire into privacy and now enjoys the privilege of being spared such exposure and public responsibility.

I shall not enter here into the discussion of Heidegger's "Nazism" nor into the more comprehensive and intricate question

of a philosopher's social responsibilities.¹ Whatever one may think about these matters, the sequence derived from political circumstance—Sartre, Jaspers, Heidegger—must be reversed with regard to philosophical priority and significance. For Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* appeared in 1927 (Halle), Jaspers' *Philosophie* in 1932 (Berlin), and Sartre's *L'Être et le néant* in 1943 (Paris). Sartre is Heidegger's most original and creative pupil; Jaspers and Heidegger worked out their respective philosophies independently and simultaneously in their lecture courses after the first world war. All three of them exert an influence that can hardly be overestimated. In spite of the many attacks on existentialism, inside and outside Germany, before and after Hitler, existentialism holds its own and for the past twenty years has colored every Continental discussion in philosophy as well as theology. It is the philosophy which seems to express in Germany, France, and Italy the real problems and issues of our historical situation. The only powerful competition existentialism has met so far comes not from other academic schools of philosophy but from the Catholic church and from Marxism. I venture to say, and I shall presently try to substantiate my thesis, that the fashion of existentialism is indeed more than a fashion, for it is shaping, with ultimate logic, the basic mood of modern man's worldly existence. We are all existentialists, some consciously, some willy-nilly, and some without knowing it, because we are all more or less caught in the predicament of being "modern" by living in an epoch of dissolution of former beliefs and certainties. Even those who have never read a line of Heidegger, Jaspers, or Sartre are so familiar with such typical categories of existential philosophy as "contingency" and "finiteness" of our existence, "anxiety" and "care" and all that which Jaspers calls "extreme situations," that they can hardly imagine a normalcy apart from mediocrity.

And yet it is very difficult to say exactly what this "modernity"

¹ See my article, "Les Implications politiques de la philosophie de l'existence chez Heidegger," in *Les Temps modernes* (November 1946), and the critical response to my thesis in the issue of July 1947.

is and when it began to appear. Goethe thought that Balzac was abominably modern and "ultra," presenting in his novels "the ugly, the hideous and depraved" instead of the wholesome. Baudelaire thought that Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* was "profoundly modern." Our grandfathers thought that impressionism was terribly modern and our fathers that Van Gogh was ultramodern. Now, for us, the human comedy of Balzac has become rather antiquated in comparison with the human hell in Dostoevski's novels; poor *Madame Bovary's* problem no longer impresses us as profoundly modern; impressionism is surpassed by expressionism, and Van Gogh's paintings are realistic compared with those of surrealists. But in spite of the relativity of what a generation feels to be "modern," all these writers and artists still have something in common that distinguishes them sharply from a seventeenth-century man. They are all, to use Goethe's phrase, ultra, beyond, or "ecstatic." They do not represent in their works a human cosmos but fragments of an uncertain frame of reference. Perhaps one could say that modernity begins with the dissolution of a natural and social order in which man was supposed to have a definite nature and place, while modern man "exists," displaced and out of place, in extreme situations on the edge of chaos. Present-day modernity is therefore vastly different from what was debated under this title in the seventeenth century with regard to the relative merits of the "moderns and ancients." The comparison with the ancient classics was a comparison with works of the same kind. Milton, for example, was compared with Virgil, Corneille with Sophocles.² Our modernity, which came of age with the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, is not comparable with what has gone before because it has changed the very standards of comparison. Hence the many prognostications of a decisive change in the constitution of European life and thought during the nineteenth century, by men like Goethe, Baudelaire, Proudhon, Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, and many

² See W. Barrett, *What is Existentialism?*, Partisan Review Series II (New York 1947) p. 54.

minor figures. This change has eventually found its precise philosophical expression in the term "existence" and its altered relation to "essence." To elucidate the problem involved in, and the background behind, those two concepts we shall have to explain, first, Heidegger's concept of existence; second, the relation between essence and existence in the thought of Aristotle, Thomas, and Hegel; and third, the reaction against Hegel's philosophy of essential existence by Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Marx.

Heidegger's Concept of Existence

We shall confine the discussion of existentialism to Heidegger's concept of existence as presented in *Sein und Zeit*,³ passing over Jaspers' philosophy because Heidegger is more modern and radical. He is more radical because his analysis of Being within the horizon of Time does not, like the "elucidation of existence" by Jaspers, *presuppose*, and then relativize, the objective knowledge of positive science and *aim* at a traditional though relativized metaphysics of objective transcendence. Accordingly, Heidegger's existential introduction to the interpretation of Being as such presents an unbroken unity of thought, starting from the fundamental analysis of man's existence, while Jaspers' philosophy consists of three parts: (1) orientation in the objective world; (2) appeal to existence; (3) search for transcendence. The two latter concepts reflect the traditional ideas of a human "soul" and its relation to "God." What Heidegger calls "world," "existence," and "transcendence" are entirely different. His interpretation of the phenomenon "world" does not presuppose the scientific understanding of the world, for the scientific understanding of Being, as applied to man and the world, is philosophically a problem and not a possible starting point. Likewise Heidegger rejects the whole enterprise of "metaphysics" in the traditional sense of this

³ Occasionally we shall also refer to *Was ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1929), *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (Halle 1929), and *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt-am-Main 1943).

word where it indicates something eternal, infinite, perfect. Instead he proposes to understand man's being in particular and Being in general within the horizon of Time. What Heidegger calls metaphysics is bound up with the structure of man's finite existence in the world. It is metaphysics in an entirely untraditional sense, namely, a "finite metaphysics of finiteness." And since Heidegger neither starts with positive science nor aims at positive metaphysics, the middle concept of Jaspers' philosophy, "existence," also has a different meaning for him. It is true that human existence as understood by Heidegger also oversteps or "transcends" itself, but not toward a perfect Being. Existence transcends itself toward its own world, and nothing else. Heidegger's existentialism is uncompromisingly "worldly," not even this-worldly but simply worldly, without any positive or negative concern about a beyond; and yet it is not at all a positivistic secularism. In the last analysis, the religious positions of Jaspers and Heidegger are even strangely inversed: the intellectual background of Jaspers, who has a certain leaning toward religion and a definite affinity to liberal protestantism, is positive science,⁴ while Heidegger, from whose philosophy Sartre has drawn atheistic conclusions, was nurtured by theology and still retains much more of a religious pathos than Jaspers' "philosophical faith," which is no more than a last echo of secularized Christianity in German idealism. Finally, with regard to their styles of thinking: Jaspers retains the Hegelian ambition of embracing the totality of possible levels and attitudes. He built up a system which is in principle finished, though fluid and undulating. Heidegger is cutting through and digging in, and the apodictic form of his diction should deceive no one about the unresolved tensions of an unfinished and still maturing conception.

The following is a bare outline of Heidegger's concept of existence, leaving aside the more appealing and popular aspects of his philosophy, that is, all the concreteness, plenitude, and suggestive-

⁴ See J. Collins, "Philosophy of Existence and Positive Religion," in *Modern Schoolman* (January 1946) p. 89.

ness of its phenomenological analyses. I shall concentrate on the bare notion of existence in its relation to essence. Heidegger's startling thesis is that man's nature or essence is nothing else but "existence." What does this mean and imply? Heidegger begins his great work with a quotation from Plato's *Sophist*: "Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what you mean when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you always, from the first, understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood it, but now we are in a great strait." Out of this embarrassment that we are constantly handling and apparently understanding Being, but are ignorant of its meaning, Heidegger made the effort of beginning, as it were, from scratch. Several prejudices with regard to the notion of Being obstruct such an attempt. The chief prejudice is that Being is the most general, abstract, and empty of all notions. For there is indeed nothing of which we do not predicate that it "is." God, we say, is; the world is; man is; values are; propositions are true or false. Today is the twenty-first of January, this is a classroom and this is a lecture—and there we are. In each of these different apprehensions of something which "is" we coapprehend vaguely a general character of Being as such. But this general character is not the generality of a genus under which more specific sorts of beings are subsumed. For Being, in its universal and abstract sense, surpasses all the different kinds of real or ideal beings. It is not a particular though more general kind of something real. It seems rather to be nothing. Being as such, therefore, is undefinable by *genus proximum* and *differentia specifica*. The question, "What is Being?" or "What is the meaning of 'Is'?" seems to be an impossible and insoluble problem, for the question already implies what is asked for, namely, an "is." How and from where can we then approach Being as such?

We can approach it only if pure Being, or Being as such, is in some way related to a concrete being, though surpassing it. Perhaps Being is not only the most general and empty notion but also something quite individual. This is indeed the case. For there

is among all beings a unique being which alone can question Being as such and thus make ontology possible. A house or a plant or an animal has never asked, "What is Being?" It is man alone who can ask such an extravagant question. And why can and does he ask so? Because he is an exceptional, fatally privileged being, or, in Heidegger's ontological term, a *Da-sein*, a being-there. He is in his real being an ontological being, that is, a being capable of transcending his own and every other concrete being toward Being as such. As a self he can relate himself to other beings, to everything in the world, and to his own being in it, and thereby surpass all these kinds of concrete beings. With the emergence of man or *Da-sein* amidst all other beings there occurs an "inroad" into the totality of beings, which opens the view on Being as such. Man can surpass or transcend every particular being and ask about Being as such because he is the only being which, in his being-there, is concerned *with* his being and is thereby open for its possible comprehension.

Despite the sheer factuality of our "being-there" we are not simply extant (*vorhanden*), like a stone, nor are we determined by an alien purpose (*zuhanden*), like a hammer which is what it is as something "to hammer with" and which only man can handle, for the hammer itself has no self and cannot enjoy its own purpose. In distinction from these two other ways of being, the merely extant and the functional being, man has the privilege of being in such a way that he is thrust upon himself as a self, and yet owns his own being. He can, therefore, also withdraw from it, in suicide and sacrifice. Animals which are possessed by their natural being cannot transcend it, neither by taking possession of it nor by withdrawing from it. This kind of Being or rather to-be, which is peculiar to human *Da-sein*—that is, responsibility to one's own being, without, however, being responsible for being-there—Heidegger calls existence. It is man's way or manner of being-there. Existence is, however, not a fixed quality like being tall or short. It is a constant possibility. We *can* exist in this or that manner, authentically or unauthentically, in an individual or

in an average way. However we choose to be, these possibilities remain inevitably *each one's* own possibilities. Man's *Da-sein*, which chooses and pursues one of his possibilities is always *my* personal or *your* personal existence, amidst and in spite of all sociality. In all his taking care of something and caring for others, man is ultimately concerned with his own being and possibilities, which rest, however, on the sheer fact of his being-there. As such a being he can reflect upon and ask about Being as such, and elaborate a philosophy of Being, or ontology.

Thus we can now understand why the most abstract, impersonal, and general question of ontology is intimately bound up with a most concrete, personal, and specific being. A philosophical analysis of Being can only be worked out on the basis of an existential analysis of man's being; it has to start from a "*fundamental* ontology." It is true that the universal concept of Being transcends every concrete being, but it cannot be grasped unless we reduce the ontological problem methodically to man's existence as the ultimate *source* and also *end* of the ontological interest. To answer the universal question of Being we have to concentrate this transcendent quest in a most singular being, namely, that of the questioner. The claim of beginning without any such presupposition—"standpointless," as it were—is an illusory pretension.

After these preliminary statements Heidegger proceeds to a more detailed analysis of man's being. Man's being, which is concerned with his own being, has *to-be*—that is, he must be; he cannot surrender his being-there to some other being and get rid of it. He is, rather, surrendered or delivered up to himself. He has, therefore, to bear, as long as he exists, the "burden" of existence as an essential character of his being-there. If, says Heidegger, one can speak at all of man's essence, then this so-called essence is implied in the fact that he has *to-be*; in other words, man's essence has to be understood from his existence. It may or may not be correct that man is a rational animal (Aristotle) or an *ens creatum* (Thomas), a creature in the theological sense, or a compound of spirit, soul, and body—whatever his essence may

be, first of all he *is* there, as a self-concerned existence. "The Essence of (man's) *Da-sein* is his Existence." While essence refers to the conceivable *what* I am, existence refers to the factual *that* I am and have-to-be. This *that* precedes in man's existence whatever he is, biologically, psychologically, socially.

Man's existence implies further that he is *in the world*. But the "world" is not an external sum total of all extant beings, nor is it a system of merely functional beings. It is a universal and yet existential structure. Man is not like a stone in the world but is essentially relating himself to "his" world. He is constituting and "projecting" the world into which he is thrown and by which he is swayed and permeated. He is from the very outset of his human existence a worldly existence. "To-be-in-the-world" is a fundamental character of man's existence. To have a world means more than to behave within a given environment. It means, rather, to be open for the manifestation of Being as such by "ek-sisting," that is, by being exposed to the totality of being and having to stand such an exposed or "ecstatic" existence. Organic and inorganic nature is alive or lifeless, respectively, but does not exist in the human dimension of a self- and world-transcending existence. And the world itself is not a blind mass of being but a way or state of being. "Cosmos" in Greek philosophy means not simply *physis* but a specific constitution of the natural world, an orderly totality as distinct from a disorderly, chaotic totality of the same beings which, as cosmos, are *kata kosmon*, cosmos-like. And this total state of being is further related to human beings; only to human beings who are awake is the cosmos a "common" world, while in the state of sleep each individual has his own world. The emphasis on the relatedness of world to man became accentuated in the Christian understanding of the world. For St. Paul cosmos is not primarily a cosmic state but directly a state of man—humanity in the state of alienation from God. In both traditions, classic and Christian, cosmos or world transcends the concept of nature. Nature, says Heidegger, cannot elucidate the ontological character of world and of our being in it because

nature is only a kind of being within our world and we encounter it therefore within the analysis of man's being-there. Thus the initial definition of the fundamental being whose essence is absorbed in existence seems to stand firm.

As a pure factuality of worldly existence, man has no wisdom about his *whence* and *whither*. For this very reason he feels all the more intensely the pure fact of his being, the factuality *that* he is, no matter how much he may try to surrender himself to some busyness in order to evade the uneasy consciousness of being ultimately nothing else than a factual self or existence. Heidegger calls this factuality of one's own existence *Geworfenheit*, "being-thrown" into existence. No human *Da-sein* has ever freely decided whether it wants to come into existence. Hence, it is utterly unintelligible why we have to be. Out of this experience man makes many attempts to throw himself out of his being thrown into existence by projecting this and that. The ultimate project (*Entwurf*) which man can and ought to project is, however, the anticipation and appropriation of his death. For only by anticipating and facing resolutely the *end* of a still unfinished existence can a human existence become "whole" and wholly intense. By anticipating death as the final end man acknowledges his final finiteness and ultimate nothingness.

This nothingness of our being-there is revealed primarily in indefinite anxiety. Anxiety is distinct from definite fear of this and that. It is concerned not with particular objects in the world but with the whole of our worldly being-there. In such an anxiety, which may emerge on quite trivial occasions, man suddenly loses his customary hold on the world. The whole of Being seems to drift away into nothing. But this experience of stretching out into nothingness is in itself a positive one, for it gives us the necessary background against which we become aware of Being as such—of the amazing fact "that there is something" and not nothing, "the wonder of all wonders."

Being open-minded to this anxiety and advancing freely toward the inevitable end is the highest test of man's freedom from con-

tingency and at the same time to it. Just because factual existence does not rest upon anything but itself, it is the factual source of a radical freedom, of the freedom to will one's own finiteness and to assent to that fundamental nothingness which pervades all Being for us. Radical freedom, that is, freedom in regard to Being as such, and not only from certain conditions of life, is bound up with the manifestation of nothingness.

This is, very briefly and roughly, the outline of Heidegger's concept of existence. I think it would be very difficult to refute the so-called "nihilism" of existential ontology, on theoretical as well as moral grounds, unless one believes in man and world as a creation of God or in the cosmos as a divine and eternal order—in other words, unless one is not "modern." This does not mean that the problem of nothingness is an invention of existentialism. Like "existence," the "nothing," too, has always been a problem, but in very different contexts with essence and with being.

In Jewish-Christian theology the nothing is an absolute void. It is conceived as the empty and powerless opposite to the omnipotence of God, who creates being out of nothing. In classic philosophy the nothing is the negative borderline of being; it is not positive but merely absence of being or, more precisely, of being-formed or being-shaped. In modern existentialism nothingness is not merely absence of, or contrast to, Being but belongs essentially to Being as such. Moreover, it is the ontological condition of freedom. Thus Heidegger ventures to reverse the classical saying, *ex nihilo nihil fit* (out of nothing nothing can emerge), into the opposite thesis, *ex nihilo omne ens qua ens fit* (out of nothing—that is, from possible nothingness—all being as such emerges). This proposition is anticlassic because it endows the nothing with a creative significance, and it is anti-Christian because it applies the doctrine of divine creation out of nothing to a finite existence. For a finite existence like man the meaning of Being as such becomes manifest only in the face of nothingness. The experience of it reveals the amazing strangeness of Being as such. On account of this experience of Being in the state of

slipping away the question can arise, "Why is there anything at all rather than nothing?" This quest for an ultimate "why" of Being as such motivates also all our secondary questions about the particular causes or reasons of this and that.

The logical evidence of the traditional proposition that "nothing is without cause," the "principle of sufficient reason," rests on the translogical fact that man can ask about the "why" of his own and every being. The possibility, however, of asking "why" rests on the fact that man's existence is not bound up with and contained in itself but is removed from it. Man is a self-transcendent existence which has a certain free play and is therefore capable of thinking and acting in possibilities, in projects, instead of merely accepting given realities. Hence we can ask: why this and *not* that; why thus and *not* otherwise; why is there anything at all and *not* nothing? The possibility of asking "why not" refers to our freedom as the ultimate ground of these transcending questions. But this freedom has a radical limitation. It is the freedom of a contingent and finite existence and therefore finite in itself. The freedom of overstepping or transcending all particular kinds of being, which enables us to ask "why not" is, together with man's existence, an enterprise or "project" which is thrust upon us. We are, as Sartre says, "condemned to freedom." The ultimate ground of our causal question, that is, our freedom, is in itself groundless—or bottomless (*Abgrund*), incapable of grounding freely itself.

All this is certainly modern, but neither classic nor Christian. Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* leaves no doubt that Christian and Greek ontology are no longer acceptable to him. His whole work is intended as an introduction to the "destruction" of the ontological tradition, that is, to a critical re-examination of the original foundations and limitations of the Greek and scholastic notions of Being. The fundamental limitation of Greek ontology is, in regard to the problem of Being, that it understands man's being and Being in general in orientation to the *world* as cosmos and *physis*, and, in regard to the problem of Time, that it takes its

orientation from what is *present* and *always present* or eternal.⁵ In other words, Greek thought has no sense for man's exceptional, "ecstatic" existence, and therefore no sense for the future as the primary horizon of all human projects.

The fundamental limitation of medieval ontology is that it has taken over the results of Greek thought without their original motivations and transplanted them into the basic doctrine of creation, according to which all finite being is an *ens creatum* as opposed to God's *ens increatum*. On this theological basis man's essential existence consists in transcending himself toward his creator. This idea of transcending toward a perfect and infinite being subsequently became diluted and secularized. It pervades the whole transcendental philosophy of German idealism and also Jaspers' semi-Christian existentialism.

Against this whole decaying tradition Heidegger ventured to re-examine anew the problem of Being. He nowhere pretends to have solved it, saying explicitly in the last paragraph of *Sein und Zeit* that its only purpose is to kindle the question and to bring into motion what has become stalemated. He concludes his work not with a ready-made answer but with a series of open questions, and he is still on the way—away from the initial pathos of resolute "existentialism"! This "being-on-the-way," which is the strength and honesty but also the weakness and hypocrisy of modern thinking, is not a Christian pilgrimage toward a definite goal but, as with Nietzsche, an adventurous wandering where the wanderer is afraid but also proud of not knowing whither the adventure might lead him.

In view of the earnestness and radicality of Heidegger's enterprise, it was a strange mistake when in the twenties those who disliked existentialism thought that they could dismiss it as a "philosophy of inflation." But even twenty years after the publication of *Sein und Zeit* one could still read in an article in the

⁵ See Helene Weiss, "The Greek Conceptions of Time and Being in the Light of Heidegger's Philosophy," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (December 1941) pp. 173 ff.

New York *Times* (July 6, 1947) the following definition of existentialism: "It was invented by a Nazi, Heidegger; it is a philosophy of nihilism like Nazism, appropriate to the vacuity of German life." Unfortunately, for this definition, existentialism was invented during the Weimar Republic (which offered Heidegger a chair at Berlin University) when the vacuity of German intellectual life was still pretty well filled by a host of other philosophies of "life," "culture," and "values." Existentialism has outlived not only the Weimar Republic but also the Third Reich. It has even gained ascendancy and has its strongest support now in France, the classical country of Cartesian rationalism. The German postwar climate after the first world war did perhaps stimulate, but it could not cause, the rise of existentialism, the germ of which was planted long ago.

The Relation between Essence and Existence in the Thought of Aristotle, Thomas, and Hegel

To estimate the significance of the existentialist innovation in the understanding of existence one has to contrast it with the relation between essence and existence in the philosophical tradition. In some way existence has always been a fundamental problem in man's thought about Being. The real issue is not the birth of an entirely new problem but a new way of posing the same old problem within a different context. What is new in modern existentialism is that the traditional reference of existence to essence is replaced by the absorption of essence into existence.

Aristotle, in Book VI of his *Metaphysics*, discusses the several meanings of Being. All sciences, he says, mark off some particular realm of being without inquiring into Being simply as Being. For example, the science of building presupposes the existence of certain building materials without inquiring into the creativity that brings a building, through the mind of an architect, into existence. Metaphysics, however, seeks the principles and causes of all beings "in so far as they are or exist," while sciences take existence for granted. They also neglect the inquiry into the con-

ceivable essence of their particular realms of being. So far, Aristotle sounds much like Heidegger, or, rather, Heidegger seems to have restated Aristotle. But then Aristotle goes on to say that the neglect of existence and essence are only two aspects of "one and the same omission" and that "the one goes along with the other" for, he says, the inquiry into *what* something is (its essence) also decides *if* it is (its existence). Essence and existence are both manifest to "the same kind of thinking."

These few sentences indicate the limitation of classic ontology. They show that Aristotle, in spite of his emphasis on Being as Being, is not concerned with the sheer factuality of existence in general or with the contingency of human existence in particular, but with essential existence, because "whatness" and "thatness" are inseparable and neither precedes the other. It is true that over against Plato's "idea," Aristotle asserts that the *ousia* or essence is a real substance, but just because he defines it in opposition to Plato his own concept of Being is that of being-something, and in its full sense it is the being of something which has the reason or ground of its being in itself. Accordingly Aristotle explicitly excludes from his considerations whatever is by accident or chance. For, he argues, an accidental or inessential existence cannot become the subject of a rational science. Accidents are innumerable and incalculable; the fortuitous, he says, "is practically a mere name." As an illustration, he points out that a spacious house may be comfortable for a large and rich family but inconvenient for a small and poor family. This is, however, accidental to the essential character of a house. This illustration shows again that the "accidental" which Aristotle has in mind is not the principal accidentality of a whole existence as such, but only the particular accident that may occur to something which already exists essentially. All serious philosophy, he concludes, is either of that which is always what it is, or at least for the most part and as a rule.

Within this sound limitation of Aristotle's thought the existentialist question, "Why is there anything at all rather than nothing?"

ing?" and the corresponding emphasis on the contingency and factuality of existence could not emerge. It could not, not because Aristotle was a modern positivist but because he was a Greek thinker for whom existence as such—that there is something—was an unquestionable element within the essential structure, order, and beauty of an always existing cosmos without beginning and end, including the existence of rational animals called men. They are distinguished from other beings not by the irrational freedom of sheer willing and projecting, but by the freedom of disinterested contemplation. The highest distinction of man is that he is capable of contemplating this perfect hierarchy of an imperishable universe within which each being has its definite properties, place, and degree of perfection. For Aristotle the ultimate source of philosophical research is "amazement"—not, however, about the strange factuality of Being as such but about the hidden principles of the orderly changes in the visible universe.

The Aristotelian view of the world was taken over by Thomas, but with some important modifications.⁶ For Thomas, as a Christian theologian and believer, all being is primarily *ens creatum*, brought into existence out of nothing by the absolutely free will of a transcendent creator. Accordingly, within Christian thought the concept of existence has a definite priority to that of essence, and to that extent Thomas is an "existentialist" or, rather, existentialism is derived from Christian thinking. Its quest for an ultimate why of existence as such, as expressed in Heidegger's question, "Why is there anything at all rather than nothing?" was not asked by Greek philosophy, but is implicit in the story of creation and explicit in existentialism, though apart from creation.

Thomas distinguishes between *ens* or a being and *esse* or to-be, the latter meaning the act of existence. To accentuate existence he speaks of *ipsum esse*, of the very existence of a being. This *esse* or to-be is the verb root of *ens* and *essentia*, of being and essence. An existing being is a *quidditas* or essence, in so far as it is conceivable and definable in regard to what it is. For every-

⁶ See E. Gilson, *Le Thomism*, 5th ed. (Paris 1945) pp. 42 ff. and 511 ff.

thing is known by what it is, its essence. But of all created substances nothing is what it is by itself (*ens per se*). Only God is without a cause because he alone exists essentially; his very essence is to-be. Seen in this Christian perspective of creation Aristotle's analysis of the various reasons why a certain being is what it is is insufficient. For what Aristotle demonstrates are only the inherent principles of an existing something, but neither does he ask nor can he answer why something is at all. He is not radical, as Thomas and Heidegger are. Prior to a formative principle is the beginning of existence as such. Aristotle's actualizing form is not the first principle of existence; it determines only the completion of a potential existence. On the level of Aristotle one can only inquire into the existence of something already existing. But the first principle of Being is *ipsum esse*, the very to-be, and this is for Thomas not only a most *strange* factuality (as it is for existentialism) but also the most wonderful and *perfect* actuality. To-be is already an indication of perfection, in accordance with the biblical saying that all created things are as such good and perfect, simply by being endowed with existence. This is, of course, the very opposite to the mood of modern existentialism and yet comes very close to it. For if we abstract from God as the only essential existence, modern and Christian existentialism agree in this that all *finite* existence is *not* an essential existence, existing necessarily by itself. For Thomas, too, existence is an exceptional category, undefinable by a "what" or essence. The knowledge of what something is does not yield anything for demonstrating that it is. Thus existence seems to be entirely adventitious, coming from outside, and hence we might conclude—not only with modern existentialists but also with the Arab and Jewish Aristotelians of the tenth and twelfth centuries (Al-Farabi, Algazel, Avicenna, Maimonides)⁷—that existence is a pure accident. Thomas often seems to be of their opinion and yet he criticizes them severely

⁷ See Emil L. Fackenheim, "The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Maimonides," in *Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research*, vol. 16 (1946-47).

because to him this apparent accident of existence is the very heart of being. It appears as an accident only if one starts from essence, but if one starts from the whole existing being, then existence reveals itself not only as a different order from essence but also as a far superior order, for without it no *ens* and essence would be. The fact of existence is for Thomas the most "intimate," "profound," and "perfect," though undefinable, determination which includes all the rest.

Thus the existentialist thesis that existence precedes essence can be traced back to Christian thinking from which, however, it is strictly separated by the doctrine of creation. Existentialism is creationism without creator. On the other side, in the perspective of creation finite existence is not only contingent and unjustifiable by itself, but the contingent and finite aspect of existence emerges only within such a transcendent perspective toward a necessary, infinite, and essential being.⁸

This idea of an essential existence persisted in the form of the ontological argument for the existence of God from Anselm to Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz and Wolff. Only Kant destroyed it. He argued that in no case can existence be "picked out" from

⁸ Sartre, in *L'Être et le néant* (Paris 1943) pp. 653, 708, 713 ff., 717, 721, draws indeed the ultimate conclusions from the premises of radical existentialism when he asserts that the ideal of pure existence is to become—God! The *pour-soi*, he argues, is always its own deficiency for it lacks the solid self-sufficiency of an *en-soi*. The *pour-soi* emerges only through the appropriation and annihilation of an *en-soi*. But through this assimilating annihilation of an alien world *en-soi* the *pour-soi* projects itself toward the ideal of becoming eventually an *en-soi-pour-soi*. In other words, the groundless freedom of projecting wants to transform itself into a being which is the ground or reason of itself, that is, it projects ultimately the idea of God as *ens causa sui*. But this idea and that project are, according to Sartre, an impossible project and idea. "The fundamental passion of man" is therefore "in vain" and thus it happens that men escape from the absolute and yet bottomless responsibility of their chance-existence "into solitary drunkenness or to the leading of nations." It is true, Sartre says, that man can essentially *ask* for a reason of his contingent existence but this quest implies the perspective toward an essential existence which is the reason of its own being. What man actually *experiences* is the constant and inevitable failure of his attempt to surrender his contingent and bottomless existence to something necessary and grounded in itself. Compare H. Marcuse, "Remarks on J. P. Sartre's *L'Être et le néant*," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (March 1948) p. 315.

essence. A real God or one hundred real dollars and an imagined God and one hundred imagined dollars are essentially—that is, as to *what* they are—the same. What distinguishes them is not their conceivable essence but the nonrational positivity of existence which is external to essence.

One may doubt whether Kant's criticism of the ontological argument really meets the point of Anselm's demonstration. But the distinction between existence and essence is valid with regard to all finite beings, since the difference between essence and existence is the very mark of finitude, as was already urged by Thomas. After Kant and against him the ontological proof for the existence of God became re-established by Hegel, on the basis of Aristotle, though in the service of a Christian philosophy of religion. Like Aristotle, Hegel starts from the identity or, rather, the togetherness of factual existence and conceivable essence, of Being and Thought, excluding therefore, as did Aristotle, the accidental, the chance-existence from the interest of metaphysical science. He defines the real as the result of a dialectical "unity of essence and existence," of the "inner" essence and "external" existence. Beings which do not attain to such a congruence are, according to Hegel, "insignificant," "trivial," "casual" existences about which philosophy need not trouble itself. Having thus excluded the contingent from the interest of knowledge Hegel extends his definition of reality to all beings which have a "true" or "real" existence in the emphatic sense of this word. There is, according to Hegel, no real existence which is not essential and necessary; there is no reality—neither in nature nor in history—which is not reasonable, and no reason which is not real. Hence his bold confidence that philosophical reason can penetrate the whole universe and make it intelligible to us. This extension of the unity of reality and reason, of being and thought, of existence and essence, to every "true" being implies that nothing in this world is absolutely finite and thereby split into existence and essence. Everything real participates, on different levels, in the infinite, the absolute, the divine.

On the basis of the Jewish-Christian distinction between created and uncreated being, between the finite and the infinite, but with the conceptual means of Aristotle, Hegel overdid what was sound in classic philosophy and perverted what was genuinely Christian. For the thesis of the structural unity of essence and existence serves him as a theodicy, as a justification of God in the world of nature and history. What, according to Thomas and Christian theology in general, is an ontological privilege of God—namely, to have an essential existence—is, according to Hegel's confusion of Aristotelian metaphysics and Christian theology, valid for every being which can reasonably and emphatically be said "to be." Reality is everywhere the manifestation of an existing "*logos*," a concept in which the Greek *nous* is inextricably confounded with the *logos* of the New Testament.

Opposed to this Hegelian "reconciliation" of conceivable essence and factual existence, of reason and reality, thought and being, there emerged in the 1840's the many-sided attacks on Hegel's philosophy and on philosophy as such by Schelling, Kierkegaard, Feuerbach, and Marx. All of them were anti-Hegelians and, with the exception of Schelling, therefore Hegelians. They insisted, with different aims and in opposite directions, on the factual, naked, "unforethinkable" positivity of sheer existence as opposed to Hegel's philosophy of rational reality or essential existence.

Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Marx

When Schelling in his later period distinguished between positive and negative philosophy, claiming the positive one for himself and accusing Hegel of having been negative, he meant that reason can only reach the ideal essence of things, their possibility or that which can be, but never any positive, that is, positively posited, existence. Hegel, he says, hypostatized the rational concept of what something is to a fake-existence, simulating in his dialectical movements of thought the real. He has thus transformed all living reality into a "desert of Being." Rational philosophy is nega-

tive with regard to existence because reality cannot be anticipated by thought. It is "unforethinkable"; it can be grasped only "empirically," by metaphysical empiricism. A true philosophy of reality has to begin with the presupposition of accidental existence, the *geradezu Existierende*, the *ipsum esse* of Thomas. Reality cannot be thought out; it comes into existence, and to reach a philosophical understanding of it, it is first of all necessary to "tear oneself away" from the blind fact of existence. "The whole world is such an unforethinkable, blind existence."

The pupils of Hegel who listened to Schelling's Berlin lectures in which he announced his program of a new age of philosophy, even of religion, were as much impressed as the pupils of Husserl who listened, thirty years ago, in Freiburg to Heidegger and turned away from Husserl's theory of *epoche*, of "bracketing" real existence in order to grasp the pure essence of things. In Schelling's audience were Russian and German Hegelians, and society; among them were Kierkegaard, Friedrich Engels, Bakunin, and Jacob Burckhardt. Since most of the audience expected a revolutionary tendency they were disappointed when Schelling developed his scholastic doctrine of *Potenzen*, aiming at a philosophy of mythology and revelation. Schelling's last academic activity was the first important step toward a break with Hegel's reconciliation of reason and reality, of essence and existence, and a new beginning after Hegel's conscious consummation of the "history of the concept," that is, of the whole European philosophical tradition.

The most important and influential "existentialists" among the next generation were Kierkegaard and Marx. Neither of them directed the philosophical tradition into new channels, as did Schelling, but they opposed, together with Hegel's system, the metaphysical enterprise as such. If modern philosophers have a bad conscience in the pursuit of their theoretical profession,⁹ it is mainly due to Kierkegaard's and Marx's radical criticism of phi-

⁹ See H. Arendt, "What is Existenz Philosophy?" in *Partisan Review* (Winter 1946) p. 40.

losophy as such and to their practical tendencies. We have lost Hegel's confidence that reality cannot resist the power of thought and concept.

What Kierkegaard and Marx were concerned with was not disinterested speculation about universal structures, but individual and social practice, or, more precisely, ethical and political action with regard to the religious and political conditions of contemporary human existence. For Kierkegaard philosophy became reduced to the psychological analysis of the inner stages of life, for Marx to the social-economic analysis of the external conditions of production. Both emphasized, though in opposite directions, the naked fact of our personal and social existence. They understood the human world of the nineteenth century as determined by commodities and money (Marx), and the individual of the *fin de siècle* as permeated by irony, boredom, and despair (Kierkegaard). Hegel's consummation of the history of the spirit became for both an end, preparatory to an extensive social revolution and an intensive religious reformation, respectively. Hegel's "concrete mediations" turned for both into abstract "decisions," either for the old Christian God (Kierkegaard) or for a new social world (Marx). Hence a theory of social practice and a reflection upon inner action replace Hegel's Aristotelian belief in the supreme dignity of pure contemplation. Kierkegaard and Marx both turn Hegel's reconciliation of state with society and church into a radical criticism of the capitalist world and of secularized Christianity, thus destroying together from two opposite ends the world of the Christian bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century.

The philosophical foundation of their radical criticism is to be found in their relation to Hegel's basic concept of reality as "unity of essence and existence." Protesting against the chapter on "Reality" in Hegel's *Logic*, Kierkegaard, like Schelling, contends that real reality is inseparable from that which is by accident and therefore cannot be assimilated and comprehended by an ontological logic. The most intimate character of reality is its contingency or, in religious terms, existence as such is a "miracle," the

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unexplicable miracle that there is something, in particular that I am there, here and now. This fact is, according to Kierkegaard, the only real "interest" of metaphysics and upon this interest speculative metaphysics cannot but wreck itself. Logically Hegel might be right in asserting that the pure, abstract concepts of being and nothing are identical; in reality they are, however, totally different. The real reality, says Kierkegaard, and Heidegger followed him in this, is "to be interested in or concerned with factual existence." Existential reality is an *inter-esse* or in-between the hypothetical unity of being and thought. The fundamental question, therefore, is not *what is* but *that I am*. "My life has been brought to an *impasse*, I loathe existence, it is without savor, lacking salt and sense. . . . One sticks one's finger into the soil to tell by the smell in what land one is: I stick my finger into existence—it smells of nothing. Where am I? Who am I? How came I here? What is this thing called the world? What does this world mean? Who is it that has lured me into the thing, and now leaves me there? Who am I? How did I come into the world? Why was I not consulted, why not made acquainted with its manners and customs. . . ? How did I obtain an interest in this big enterprise they call reality? Why should I have an interest in it? Is it not a voluntary concern? And if I am to be compelled to take part in it, where is the director? I should like to make a remark to him." ¹⁰

Marx's criticism of Hegel's reconciliation of essence with existence is very different from that of Kierkegaard. Even as a "materialist" Marx remained a Hegelian idealist, for his ideal of a communist society in which freedom is realized is, in principle, nothing else but the "realization" of Hegel's principle of the unity of essence and existence. The communist society, as conceived by Marx, realizes the unity of reason and reality, of general essence and individual existence. In a perfect communist commonwealth each individual has his human essence realized as a common existence. In consequence of his acceptance of Hegel's principle,

¹⁰ Kierkegaard, *Repetition* (Princeton 1941) p. 114.

Marx could say that Hegel is not to blame for having asserted the reality of reason but for having neglected the practical task of its realization through change and criticism. Instead of criticizing theoretically and changing practically the whole established reality of servitude and unreason for the sake of freedom and reason, Hegel accepted the results of our political, social, economic, and religious history as reasonable in themselves. From the critical and revolutionary standpoint of Marx such acceptance of the existent is "crassest materialism"—and Marxism purest idealism! And since Marx believed in the possibility of an empirical unity of essence and existence, he is not in the line of modern existentialism which has its name from the reduction of essence into existence.

With this rebellion of Marx and Kierkegaard against Hegel's synthesis modern existentialism begins, so far as an immediate historic filiation can be traced. Actually, modern existentialism began as early as the seventeenth century, with the Cartesian revolution in the conception of the world and its impact upon Pascal's thought about man's condition in it.

Considering the long and laborious historical process that was required to produce eventually those terms which are now popular slogans, it would be extremely superficial to think of modern existentialism as the mere product of a particular German situation.

If there is a historical and theoretical alternative at all to modern existentialism, one has only the choice of understanding the world and man's place in it either as an immutable natural order—that is, with the eyes of Greek contemplation—or as divine creation—that is, with the eyes of Jewish and Christian faith. Either choice would be indeed persuasive since one cannot wish to remain forever nailed on the cross of contingency, absurdity, and total displacement. But choosing between the one or the other "project" or *Weltentwurf* would still be an existential attitude and decision, and therefore contradictory to the nature of the chosen world-view. For neither of them is a mere project of

human choice and decision. The one is revealed and intelligible only to faith; the other, too, is revealed, though not by historical revelation but in and by nature itself to the nature of man. We cannot choose not to be modern, if it is true that modernity has, since Descartes, rested on the choice of a standpoint and viewpoint. We would have to overcome in principle the modern attitude as such toward the whole of Being if we are to overcome existentialism. This is precisely the direction in which Heidegger is now transforming and reversing the problem of "Being and Time" and the reason why he rejects, together with the traditional distinction of essence and existence, Sartre's existentialism, his own, but natural, child.¹¹ As long as we do not even intend to subject modern man and the modern world to a radical criticism, that is, to one affecting their coordinate principles, we remain existentialists, capable of asking the most radical question, "Why is there anything at all rather than nothing?"—but constitutionally incapable of answering it.

¹¹ Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit* (Berne 1947) p. 72 f.

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BOOK REVIEWS

STOLPER, GUSTAV. *German Realities: A Guide to the Future Peace of Europe*. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1948. x & 341 pp. \$3.75.

Two strong impressions remain after reading the late Gustav Stolper's book on Germany. The first is that of a man extraordinarily qualified by factual knowledge and personal experience to handle this subject. The second is that of a man whose passions, prejudices, and predilections were so strong that what might be interesting opinion often becomes dogma and what might be a valuable contribution to history becomes an interesting, thought-provoking, but at times somewhat irritating, ploughing-over of a much ploughed field of study and discussion.

The first few pages reveal the author's general attitude toward the time in which we are living. He saw the late President Roosevelt as an irresponsible dilettante and blamed him for "forcing" the Morgenthau Plan upon Churchill, for partitioning Germany, and for practically all the evil consequences of the Yalta agreement. By contrast he had this to say of former President Hoover: "In a long and variegated career in several lands, I have never met a leading statesman acting with greater wisdom, knowledge, dignity, tact and, most of all, human kindness."

Mr. Stolper was born in Austria but spent most of his life in Germany as editor of the German *Economist* and later as a Reichstag deputy from Hamburg, representing the Democratic party. (This was, in our terms, a moderate right-of-center party.) He came to this country as a refugee in 1933, having courageously opposed the National Socialists. His comparatively recent arrival on the American scene may have something to do with his unqualified judgments concerning our two recent presidents.

In several instances Stolper set out to tilt against widely held notions which he considered to be misconceptions. For example, he considered it a misconception that France has been three times wantonly attacked by Germany, even though it is true that she has been three times invaded. It is undoubtedly useful to recall the fact that both Napoleon III and Bismarck wanted the Franco-Prussian War. It is useful to place in its proper perspective the relative war guilt of the various European nations. Subject also to salutary "debunking" is the popular French myth that Germany is still capable of starting another war of aggression and the Morgenthau myth that

the way to make Germany a "peace-loving nation" is to destroy her industrial capacity. Other recent books have covered much the same ground.

Stolper, however, did not confine himself to exploding the already exploded ideas of our time. He carried his "debunking" into new and somewhat dubious ground when he asserted with considerable passion that it is all nonsense to believe that the German industrialists helped Hitler to power. According to Stolper, only Fritz Thyssen, who really didn't amount to much, was actually a Nazi. All the others were really anti-Nazis but became the unwilling victims of the Nazi regime. Why, they didn't even ask Hitler to come to their club for dinner until 1932, and then they found themselves bored by the speech he made!

One gets the feeling that the author was not so much interested in defending the individuals concerned as their role in German society and their function as "business leaders." He remarked angrily—and this is really an angry book—that "the communist interpretation of National Socialism was swallowed by American policy hook, line and sinker. National Socialism, according to this theory, was the product of capitalism. . . ." Well, wasn't it? It does not follow that capitalism *had* to produce National Socialism, or fascism; this *would* be the communist interpretation. If this concept of capitalism had ever been American policy, is it conceivable that we should be making such strenuous efforts toward the re-establishment of free enterprise in Germany?

As a matter of fact, Stolper's critique of American policy placed him in a curious dilemma. He objected vigorously to socialism. His views on this subject are rather similar to those of Senator Taft or those of his idol, Mr. Hoover, or of Professor Hayek's *Road to Serfdom*. Yet Stolper felt constrained to break a lance for the Social Democrats of the Weimar Republic, who did not—here goes another myth!—betray the young republic into the hands of the old ruling clique, as is commonly supposed, but actually saved western Europe from bolshevism. He got neatly out of this difficulty by showing that the Social Democrats stopped being socialists, became good little free enterprisers, and thus saved the republic.

Another interesting bit of "debunking" relates to the future population position of the Germans in Europe. It is nonsense, said Stolper, to think that the Germans have come out on top in what William L. Shirer calls the "demographic war." On the contrary, Stolper affirmed "the irresistible, irreversible decline of the biological strength of the

German people." This is most interesting, if true. Stolper made the flat assertion that "the year is already in sight—between 1980 and 2000—when the population of Germany (all of Germany, not only the western zones) will decline to the size of the French." Stated as an opinion backed by documentation, this would be a statement to ponder. The categorical assertion delivered *ex cathedra* destroys much of the persuasive power of an interesting compilation of facts.

The same thing is true of the thinly documented argument presented to "debunk the myth" that the Germans secretly rearmed in contravention of the Versailles Treaty. It is true, likewise, of a number of assertions which would be challenging if they were presented in a less doctrinaire manner. One more example will suffice.

Stolper referred to "the delusion that labor works harder in socialized industries than in private." Perhaps this is a delusion. Certainly there are many factors other than public or private ownership of an industry which affect the will to work of its employees. But Stolper puts one's back up against the case he wanted to present by leading off with the following statement: "This argument, so appealing to the minds of the modern intelligentsia (to which *ex definitione* all newspapermen belong) is like a ghost beyond the reach of hard reality." All newspapermen? Westbrook Pegler, for instance? Mr. Stolper himself was a newspaperman, but not one who believed in this "delusion"—nor, apparently, in one of the first rules of newspaper reporting.

This reviewer's chief criticism of a book which contains much interesting and shrewdly observed material is that it is mistitled. What appear to Stolper as German "realities" seem more like the nostalgic dreams of a disappointed German patriot, mixed with the dire forebodings of a passionate believer in the lately savored blessings of the American free enterprise economy. The "realities," as seen by Mr. Stolper, render Germany at once the key to the future recovery of Europe, a threat to American free enterprise as a competitor if it goes capitalist, and a danger to American security if it goes communist. At the same time, it is a nation "irresistibly and irreversibly" on the downgrade.

All this may be true. But the average reader will, I think, find it difficult to make the double identification which is necessary to follow the author's fiery argument. The pity of it is that Gustav Stolper really had the knowledge to make a great contribution to the central problem of the European peace settlement.

JAMES P. WARBURG

New York City

MINISTÈRE DE L'ÉCONOMIE NATIONALE, Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques. *Les Transferts internationaux des populations*. [Études et Documents. Série B-2.] Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1946. 542 pp.

This extremely valuable book is the first comprehensive study of the troubling problem of population transfer to be published on the European continent. Of special importance is the inclusion of twenty-four transfer treaties and agreements which, in the form of appendices, constitute nearly half the book. Some of them are here published for the first time and represent a significant contribution to the as yet rather scarce documentation of the subject. Among these are the papers relating to the transfer of Germans from the Italian South Tyrol, the Bulgarian-Rumanian treaty on exchange of populations, and the Soviet-German agreements on the transfer of the Germans from the Baltic countries, which apparently were discovered by the victorious Allied armies in the archives of the Reich and those of its satellites.

A substantial portion of the book is devoted to a comparative subject analysis of the provisions of these treaties. All matters concerning the transfer of persons with its manifold implications are minutely studied, and the points of similarity and divergence carefully noted. The same treatment is accorded the provisions dealing with the transfer of property, movable and immovable, as well as those concerned with debts, titles, and other obligations of the transferees.

This arrangement of the material on topical rather than regional lines undoubtedly has great advantages. It avoids repetition, for certain essential elements are common to almost all transfer agreements and operations; it also offers wider possibilities for a synthetic approach to each of the various problems involved. The authors of the book have made the most extensive use of these possibilities, and have dealt with each particular topic with a thoroughness and perspicacity that bespeak highly skilled and well trained legal minds. On the other hand, this topical method is unavoidably conducive to a rather deadly schematization. It eliminates consideration of the specific features peculiar to each transfer operation, of its human aspects and practical implications. As a matter of fact, the subject of the book is not so much "transfer of populations" as "treaties on transfer of populations." What is here analyzed is not the actual transfer of masses of people, but the written provisions that regulated these mass movements. Logically and juridically such provisions can certainly be compared and weighed. But population transfers are more than written docu-

ments. What matters most is not the legal rulings on the problems involved, but their application and its results. On this point, however, the book is somewhat reticent.

It is true that the first part of the study offers a brief factual survey of the transfers covered by the treaties and agreements published in the appendices, but the average reader would find it very difficult to get a clear view of the magnitude and complexity of the issue from the facts and figures presented. There are some regrettable inaccuracies, such as the reference to the 237,802 Germans allegedly transferred from the South Tyrol; actually not more than 75,000 were transferred. Also it is odd that a book which appeared in 1946 makes no mention of the Polish-Soviet agreements on exchange of populations, concluded on September 9 and 23, 1944, and on July 9, 1945, or of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty signed on June 29, 1945. The text of the latter was published *in extenso*, and detailed communiqués on the former appeared in the press. All these treaties contain essential innovations, which merit consideration.

The attitude of the book toward population transfer as an expedient in solving minority problems is rather contradictory. The authors condemn the idea from a moral viewpoint; they reject it as incompatible with the legal concept of justice; but they admit that the transfer of populations offers a constructive political contribution to securing a durable peace. Such an attitude leads nowhere. In the last analysis, what counts is how the various aspects of any program balance each other. The book draws no definite conclusion regarding the relative weight of the component factors.

JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN

New York City

BAER, YITZHAK F. *Galut*. New York: Schocken. 1947. 121 pp. \$1.50.

This book is one in the series of beautiful and compact volumes which Schocken Books has been producing. The publisher's program of presenting Jewish subjects to the general reader in a format which is a pleasure to look at and to handle deserves more recognition than it seems to me to have received, and his undertaking to bring to public attention the work of authors whose style is no less distinguished than their scholarship is another merit for which the publisher could take a bow. One of these authors is Yitzhak Baer, an authority on Jewish history who has been teaching the subject at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. His present essay is a summary review of how Jews

through the ages interpreted their existence outside of Palestine and its relation, past and future, to Palestine.

The core of the interpretation is denoted by the word "Galut" which is sometimes translated as "exile" and sometimes as "diaspora." The more frequent translation is "diaspora," which joins to the idea of exile the idea of scattering or dispersion, and implies a past union and a future reunion. Dispersion, thus, remains throughout the ages the idea of a present condition; while union and reunion imply an ancient national sovereignty and a future national independence. Independence and sovereignty are limited—one might say, indeed, rooted—in "the land," in Palestine, much promised, little possessed. In the record of Jewish reflection upon Jewish destiny, exile and restoration are supernatural events consequent upon the providence of God who has chosen the Jews to be his people, who has promised them the land of Israel for their nation, and who will surely crown the tragic abominations inflicted on them throughout their exile with restoration in glory. Their sufferings meanwhile, at the hands of Greeks and Romans, of Christians and Moslems and of their secular counterparts, may be interpreted as atonement for sin—not their own sin merely, but the entire world's—or as the necessary condition for the supernatural advent of the Messiah, or as the indefeasible testimony to the supernatural revelation on Sinai and the divine truth of the Torah. Exile and restoration are thus values. Different spokesmen of the Jewish ethos through the changing ages of unchanging Jewish suffering produce each his characteristic shaping of the central theme.

But however such personages as Judah Halevi, Maimonides, Solomon ibn Verga, Isaac Abarbanel, Joseph Albo, may differ from each other, they are at one in regarding the Galut as a supernatural dispensation. Dr. Baer is to be counted as still another figure in that tradition. His somewhat confused narrative underscores the special election and unique destiny of God's chosen people, its consequent "new culture, original and pure" on which "European moral standards" are grounded; and the persistence of this culture for two thousand years. "For two thousand years we suffered for the sake of the redemption of mankind; we were driven forth and scattered over every part of the earth because of the fateful interaction of the religious and political factors determining our history. Our place in the world is not to be measured by the measure of this world. Our history follows its own laws, maintaining its innermost tendencies in the face of outward dangers of dispersal, distintegration, secularization, and moral

and religious petrification . . . our task remains to seek our support in . . . the principle that is constantly being disclosed to us and yet whose depths will never be entirely plumbed . . . that must surely overcome the present inner crisis."

To those convinced of such a principle, reason is, of course, an irrelevancy if not an impertinence. And who shall have the hardness of heart to deny them their illusion if it comfort and sustain them, even through the terrible martyrdom they continue to undergo? So I refrain from the specific comments which Dr. Baer's mixed-up text suggests. I only observe that the courage which is wisdom concerning dangers also has its salvational merits, and that there is a strength in such courage cleansed of illusions which may prove itself far greater than that dependent upon a compensatory faith. It may well be that the Jews of these times cannot live without the latter; but it is certain that they will not survive without the former.

HORACE M. KALLEN

DESTLER, CHESTER McARTHUR. *American Radicalism 1865-1901, Essays and Documents*. [Connecticut College Monograph No. 3.] New London: Connecticut College. 1946. x & 276 pp.

This volume, as the title suggests, is not so much a history of American radicalism in the late nineteenth century as a collection of historical essays, to which are added a memorandum by Burnette Haskell to the Pittsburgh conference of various radical groups in 1883 and a speech by Henry Demarest Lloyd. The essays are the product of careful, intelligent, and sympathetic research. While some of the chapters seem of limited interest, others, particularly those dealing with Lloyd and including Professor Destler's defense of Lloyd as a historian, are doubtless of greater moment. The article on the Toledo natural gas pipe-line controversy presents an interesting study of the relation between municipal ownership and public opinion. The final chapter, dealing with the breakdown of the labor-Populist alliance at the hands of free silver, is also of considerable interest.

The unifying principle in this collection is suggested in the first chapter. It is the thesis that the greatest problem in the alliance of farmers with labor was not a conflict between Populism and trade unionism, but one that "sprang from the clash of indigenous Populism, produced by decades of cross-fertilization between urban and agrarian radical movements, with an imported, proletarian Socialism, which made its first great appeal to English-speaking wage earners in the depression-ridden nineties" (p. 30). This suggests a dual thesis: first,

the interplay between urban and rural elements in American radicalism; second, the indigenous nature of that radicalism prior to its contact with "imported" socialism. The first part is posed in contrast to the excessive preoccupation of historians with Frederick Jackson Turner's thesis of the significance of the frontier and the belief in the essentially rural character of American radicalism. The second part is more conservative and accepts the older doctrine that American radicalism was, in the heyday of Populism, essentially homespun. The thesis is a reasonable one, and it has substantial documentation. But it has two parts which may or may not be equally valid. The question whether the denial of frontier predominance in American radicalism does not imply a denial of its indigenous character (since urban influences were necessarily more cosmopolitan) has at least to be asked. Unfortunately the organization of the book does not help the reader to distinguish the relation of the specific chapters to the two prongs of the thesis. It is a rather difficult task for the author to establish his particular historical approach in allied but uncoordinated essays.

It is the interplay of urban and rural factors in which Professor Destler is especially interested, and his doctrine makes good sense. In dealing with the homespun nature of American radicalism, he quotes a plea from Harvard's President Conant for an indigenous radicalism (p. 1) and states that Conant could find that not only in nineteenth-century history but also in contemporary political life (p. 31). It would be unfair to ask Professor Destler to provide a systematic comparison between the antimonopolistic radicalism of the Populists and similar movements abroad. But more comparisons of that type would have to be made before the last word could be said on the question. Indeed, it would be well to go beyond comparisons and include a fuller discussion of the contacts of American radicals with writers and politicians abroad, to which the author makes occasional reference.

The discussion of Henry Demarest Lloyd, himself (as the author notes) only partly indigenous in his attitude and "chief architect of the labor-Populist alliance" (p. 197), is certainly one of the most interesting parts of the book. Lloyd's speech, which Destler has apparently unearthed (pp. 213-21) and Destler's comments on the speech (pp. 197-99) reveal Lloyd's attempts to reconcile European socialism, especially of the Fabian brand, with the American tradition. Whatever may be the last word on the indigenous nature of Populism, Lloyd considered himself a Jeffersonian. His fear of the concentration of wealth, rather than the Marxian dialectic, lay at the root of his doctrine.

Regardless of the merits of such political principles, one need only read Lloyd to see that he took his "Americanism" more seriously than do most of those who appeal to the American tradition these days.

The writing of the book is unfortunately uneven and often less exciting than the material would permit. Like most of us, the author finds it difficult to avoid the technical language of the social scientist.

HOWARD B. WHITE

Coe College

LEIGHTON, DOROTHEA, and CLYDE KLUCKHOHN. *Children of the People*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1947. xi & 277 pp. \$4.50.

The collaboration of an anthropologist, who is perhaps the foremost authority on the Navahos, and a physician, trained in clinical psychology and psychobiological psychiatry, has produced a happy blend: the anthropologist writes with much understanding of personality and the individual, and the psychiatrist with a clear comprehension of culture. Reporting the results of a unit of the Indian Research Project, conducted under the joint auspices of the University of Chicago and the Office of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior, *Children of the People* is concerned chiefly with the Navaho child, and how he is shaped by the culture in which he lives.

The four chapters devoted by Dr. Kluckhohn to Navaho culture emphasize the earlier years of life, and delineate the culture in terms of its effect on the growing personality. Employing an approach to the individual that is developmental, in the broadest sense, Dr. Kluckhohn discusses Navaho beliefs and customs pertaining to conception, pregnancy, and childbirth; Navaho methods of training and handling the infant and child; the reciprocal parent-child and family-child attitudes and relationships; Navaho childhood, adulthood, and old age; and Navaho beliefs and practices connected with death. The treatment falls into four parts: the first six years of life, later childhood, adult life, and the "Psychology of the People." Personality is seen as the resultant of the demands of the culture, on the one hand, and the biological drives of the individual, on the other.

Dr. Kluckhohn raises the question how there can be such a high anxiety level among adults in a culture where "infants are nursed whenever they want to be, where childhood disciplines are so permissive, where there is so much affection for children." Since this situation refutes the contention of "certain psychoanalysts and other child psychiatrists and psychologists" that the type of infantile indulgence

found among the Navahos should result in calm and beautifully adjusted personalities, he suggests that the conflicts of weaning, later experiences, and reality problems might explain the anxiety, as well as the extreme mood lability, so characteristic of the Navaho adult, and that the other theories are at fault in not taking account of the influences of later life. Dr. Kluckhohn has not stated the case quite fairly, for no type of child training can banish adult anxiety forever; it can only affect the anxiety threshold. Further, a distinction should be made between real anxiety, and what, for want of a better term, may be called neurotic anxiety. Adult Navahos have much of the latter kind. The point is not whether they have anxiety, but whether they show more than might be expected in the light of the pressures of reality and of childhood experience. Dr. Kluckhohn implies that they do. Infancy and childhood, however, may not be the idyllic series of episodes that the material seems to suggest, for among the Navahos, while there is genuine permissiveness in infancy, the demands of reality appear suddenly and harshly.

In the investigation of personality among Navaho children, the study made use of an exhaustive series of tests. The testing program, supervised and reported by Dr. Leighton, is the subject of the second half of the book. Tests were administered to 211 subjects, ranging in age from six to eighteen, from three Navaho communities—Shiprock, Ramah, and Navaho Mountain. The series comprised a physical examination; intelligence tests—Arthur Point Performance Scale and Good-enough Draw-A-Man; psychological battery—Stewart Emotional Response, Bavelas Moral Ideology, Thematic Apperception Test, Rorschach, and Free Drawings. Comparisons are made of the results in the three communities, and of these results with the outcome of similar tests given to white children.

Space does not permit the summarization of the test results. It may be of value, however, to give an example of the way in which the tests can be used to show the relationship of culture to personality. The analysis of the "shame" responses of Navaho and white children indicates that shame for the Navaho is more often related to their opinions of the external world than to their reaction to internal standards, whereas for white children the reverse is true. This is attributed to the difference in childhood training: the Navaho child is not told that things should not be done because they are wrong, but because they might invoke supernatural danger, or because "the other people" would not approve. The Navaho child, unlike the white, is threatened with shaming rather than with loss of love.

From the "attitudes and interests" tests the authors conclude that the Navahos are a practical people; that the prevailing attitude toward family members is one of warmth, with the identification of the child with the parent of the opposite sex; and that the belief in evil creatures of the supernatural world goes far beyond that held by white children.

The wide and almost confusing variety of behavior and personality among the Navahos is explained by the authors as a result of a "unique combination of hereditary, domestic and cultural experiences." And Dr. Kluckhohn accurately points to the explanation when he says that "the wide individuality of parents certainly influences their children's personalities as much as or more than convention and cultural traditions." In terms of method, this implies that the unit of study must be the family, however constituted, in a given culture, rather than the culture as a whole, or aggregates of individuals. The most telling approach to the study not only of personality formation but also of culture may be through a summation of what is learned from the careful analysis of the details of the parent-child relationship in many families. We have for many years accepted the fact that human physical heredity can be studied only through the family; this is true also for social heredity.

Both purpose and method distinguish this book. While the immediate aim of the whole project was to investigate the development of personality in five Indian tribes, its ultimate objective was to "evaluate the whole Indian administrative program, with special reference to the effect of present policy on Indians as individuals, to indicate the direction towards which this policy is leading, and to suggest how the effectiveness of Indian administration may be increased." Thus the study had both scientific and practical aims, a rare combination for the social sciences.

The method of the study is unique in two respects: the variety of social sciences involved and the techniques employed. The research was designed as the integration of a number of disciplines: anthropology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, medicine, linguistics, education, and administration. Of the utmost significance is the wide and systematic application of a variety of projective techniques for the study of personality in a "primitive" culture, and for the study of the culture itself. While projective techniques have been used previously in anthropology, they have seldom been employed on such a scale to determine the relationship of culture and personality.

Replacement of the informal, intuitive descriptions of culture and personality by more objective, easily duplicated, and verifiable opera-

tions, derived from projective techniques, is an event of considerable importance. All the implications are not yet known, but it appears that the instruments are now available for adequate studies of such phenomena as "national character" and its formation, and of diversities in personality type in a relatively homogeneous culture; and for the more precise description of the links between personality and culture than can be achieved by such general descriptions as "socialization" and "identification."

SIDNEY AXELRAD

MASON, EDWARD S. *Controlling World Trade: Cartels and Commodity Agreements*. [Committee for Economic Development Research Study.] New York: McGraw-Hill. 1946. xvii & 289 pp. \$2.50.

As is not uncommon in the realm of social sciences, the cartel discussion today proceeds simultaneously on two levels: the level of analysis proper and the level of policy or action. For his welcome contribution to this discussion Professor Mason has chosen the second level, his purpose being to develop workable policy rather than a long-run solution. Within these self-imposed limitations, the volume represents the most exhaustive and thoughtful study of the possibilities and the available techniques for concerted action with regard to restrictive practices in international markets. The chief value of the book is its unrelenting emphasis on, and careful analysis of, the many obstacles lying in the way of a concrete cartel policy. At the same time, the constant preoccupation with what is politically feasible and what, though desirable, is not feasible is perhaps the most serious of the limitations inherent in such a task as the author has set himself. If the author himself appears pessimistic about the chances for adoption of even his deliberately restricted recommendations, the fault lies not with him but with the present state of the world in which the economist's advice too often remains but a cry in the wilderness.

Professor Mason's recommendations are based on three explicit assumptions: general acceptance of an international economic policy to free world trade, as outlined in the CED statement, *International Trade, Foreign Investment and Domestic Employment* (May 1945); stable peace; and maintenance of high levels of employment in industrial countries. To these may be added the implicit assumption of the effectiveness of legislation along the lines of the American anti-trust acts to bring about and preserve competition.

The study is divided into two parts, the first devoted to private

cartels, the second to commodity agreements in raw material markets. Cartels are defined in accordance with the antitrust acts as "an association of firms in the same industry having the purpose of unreasonably restraining trade" (pp. 29-31), a definition focusing attention on the actual effect, which must be ascertained in each case by the authorities.

The author rejects cartels and, with certain carefully hedged exceptions, commodity agreements. Stating the case against private cartels, he offers what could be a solid basis for policy: "It should not be left for private business to determine when an international business agreement is needed . . . or when a market regulation plan is desirable to obviate wasteful competition or uneconomic instability" (pp. 26, 75). In a later chapter, however, he seems to reverse his position: "But the inevitability of restrictive agreements of some kind does not . . . justify attempts to make these agreements public . . . yet monopoly challenged by periodic collapse, competition of outsiders and pressure of low-cost insiders . . . is probably preferable to a comprehensive and inevitably inflexible government control scheme, except in those rare situations in which restriction of output by intergovernmental agreement is necessary to prevent even more disruptive unilateral measures" (pp. 142-43). The contradiction is only apparent. It follows with perfect consistency from the author's central belief in the availability and superiority of competition as the alternative to market control, even if this competition means periodic breakdowns, wild price gyrations, and dislocated markets.

Since effective measures to curb international cartels must themselves be international in scope, the author proposes an International Commercial Policy Organization and, subordinate to it, an International Business Office in charge of cartel policy. In his specific recommendations he goes beyond the proposals of the ITO draft charter, especially in demanding that member countries prohibit the participation of their nationals in unreasonably restrictive practices through domestic legislation. In addition, he recommends registration of international cartels with, and compulsory disclosure of information to, the Business Office, as well as the free exchange of technological knowledge, at least with regard to patents and processes acquired by the Allies from enemy countries. Clearly such provisions would put teeth into an international cartel policy.

Professor Mason's concern with political and legal aspects apparently leads him to exclude export associations and combines from the scope of his plan. The actual monopoly effect of combines is *legally*

hard to prove; moreover, governments would in general not be inclined to take steps against them (pp. 55-57). With regard to export associations Mason argues that they are necessary for presenting a common front in markets increasingly subject to control. In particular, the "probable development of state trading" makes them politically inevitable in nonstate-trading countries (p. 47, 48). The charge of restraint of trade against these associations is finally dismissed in Chapter 3 because of the advantages derived from them in foreign markets: competition as absolute value is replaced by as much competition as is beneficial to national interest—a fruitful and realistic line of reasoning. But it raises the fundamental question: what determines *how much* competition is beneficial at any given moment and what is the direction of the trend to which a realistic policy must constantly be adapted? The author points to the increase of state trading and restrictive practices of all kinds in the postwar world, but does not explain why this is so and what it means.

The American position in the event that an international policy fails to materialize is examined in Chapter 3. The author advises that the United States, economically and militarily powerful, should maintain in principle her traditional antimonopoly policy. Export associations and the participation of American business in agreements under foreign jurisdiction should be tolerated or encouraged, but participation of American firms in agreements restricting trade in world markets or limiting American imports should be curbed. Clarification of the existing antitrust and Webb-Pomerene acts through adjudication, rather than new legislation, is recommended. The question of the effects of international cartels on American security is discussed in Chapter 4.

Of special interest to the economist, in the second part of the study, is a survey of some of the most important primary industries (Ch. 6) and an exhaustive analysis of the mechanics of quota schemes and buffer stocks (Ch. 7). Control, which cannot be altogether avoided in raw material markets, must be exercised by the interested governments, but is admissible only if there is the threat of even more restrictive unilateral action by producer countries. Surpluses and excess capacity are therefore defined in political rather than economic terms. Ultimately low returns to an industry constitute overcapacity only if an attempt is made through organized pressure groups to maintain prices higher than those at which the market would be cleared (p. 197). It is not quite clear whether the author really means that in the absence of the political power to threaten unilateral

action, there would be no overcapacity and no reason to recognize the existence of an economic and social problem. This line of argument occasionally gives the impression of singular emphasis on purely American interests. According to the author, the United States is interested in the problems of the tin industry only because of her military interest in having tin sources within her strategic area and her political interest in a stable Bolivia (pp. 191-92). Also somewhat disconcerting is the following passage: "Unfortunately, we shall probably not be able to induce other countries, either by threat or by persuasion, to cooperate in controls affecting our agricultural exports unless we cooperate in controlling other commodities which we largely import" (p. 250).

With some qualifications Professor Mason accepts the proposals contained in the ITO draft charter. Commodity agreements should be conceived as self-liquidating. In order to prevent a tendency toward self-perpetuation these agreements should be coordinated under the control of the overall commercial policy organization. His chief point, however, which is emphasized throughout the study, is the necessity of providing for alternative opportunities for productive resources. In fact, a high level of employment in industrial countries—prerequisite for a large volume of world trade—is one of the three assumptions on which the recommendations are based.

The economist has reason to be grateful to Professor Mason for this comprehensive analysis of the countless difficulties arising out of traditions, institutions, and national interests. But he may be excused for raising certain questions. A crucial one is that of the alternatives to restrictive practices. In most of the current cartel discussion these practices are confronted with some undefined concept of competition—and condemned. But the conclusions drawn from such comparison hold true only if the yardstick is the perfect competition of static equilibrium theory. Restriction, however, occurs chiefly in oligopolistic industries. Professor K. Pribram, in his study, *Cartel Problems* (Brookings Institution, Washington 1935), and Professor B. Hoselitz, in "International Cartel Policy" (*Journal of Political Economy*, February 1947, pp. 5-7), pointed out that in these cases prices may not fall and output may not increase even after the removal of cartels. It is doubtful, moreover, whether competition could in the long run be enforced by law in such markets. This leads to the question of interpreting the amounts by which the volume of world trade might be larger in the absence of restriction. Since demand for most cartelized commodities appears to be more or

less income-elastic but, in the short run, very price-inelastic, the increase in amounts offered would *not*, in the short run, increase consumption but would instead result in a large and disruptive price effect. Thus it is not true that "any amount within reasonable quantitative limits *can* be disposed of *at some price*" (p. 196). The author's political definition of overcapacity must therefore be supplemented. Since only in static price theory are adaptations smooth, with high-cost firms automatically seeking greener pastures elsewhere, the price may be driven to a low where needed capacity is destroyed. There are also the effects on national income and the balance of payments to be taken into account. Moreover, contrary to the author's assumption, supply, at least of raw materials, appears generally to be of low price- and income-elasticity, which leads to the familiar cobweb pattern. Thus the problem in these markets seems to be that of a tendency toward chronic overcapacity rather than that of a unique chronic overproduction brought about by some accident.

The cartel problem cannot be fully appraised with the tools of static price theory alone. Only analysis in terms of processes in time, supplemented by quantitative research on the effects of restriction, will yield full insight. Such an investigation may also lead to a clearer distinction between the *abuses* of established cartels and the *principle* of regulating certain markets (for example, as it is recognized in the utilities field).

In his insistence on the importance of alternative opportunities for underpaid productive agents as a condition for any real solution, the author gives explicit recognition to these problems. Full employment in industrial countries being insufficient, he urges industrialization and developmental schemes in raw material countries. But does not the recourse to systematic industrialization imply the abandonment of the basis of free-trade theory (specialization in response to market forces) and, beyond that, of competition in general? Industrialization without regard to cost advantages requires governmental planning and protection. In response, old industrial countries may have to resort to compensatory "systematic" policies. And in the end a sort of international master plan may have to be established (pp. 201-02). This argument closely approaches Alvin Hansen's conclusion in *America's Role in the World Economy* (New York 1945) that commodity agreements are useful only within the broad framework of a "general program of international economic cooperation and development." The volume of world trade may thereby be increased. Whether in the process it would be freed of restriction

becomes something of an exercise in semantics. In the end, the problem of restrictive practices appears to be of far wider scope than is often realized in current discussion of cartels. Professor Mason has contributed greatly to the realization of this fact. If he did not enter in detail into the questions raised above, it is because his purpose was a different one. It is to be hoped that this book will be read not only by the professional economist but also by those persons in charge of formulating our foreign economic policy.

EMILE GRUNBERG

University of Akron

LURIE, SAMUEL. *Private Investment in a Controlled Economy. Germany 1933-1939*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1947. 243 pp. \$3.

Though dealing with a subject of great importance in a very competent manner, this is a book which somehow fails to satisfy completely. The competence lies in the enormous mass of material accumulated, the thorough knowledge of sources of information displayed, the high standard of accuracy, the acuteness of economic analysis in detail. One is further inclined to welcome the book for the fact that it does not try to give another full interpretation of the Nazi economic system but deals with a limited, though important, aspect of the system. *Vivant sequentes!* The time has clearly come to build up a picture of the Nazi economy through careful monographic attempts like the present one, rather than to attempt a premature synthesis.

Why then does the book fail to give a feeling of complete satisfaction? I think there are two main reasons, the first of which is that the author has made no attempt to integrate his results with the general body of economic theory. He could have drawn interesting conclusions, had he wanted to, on the nature of the "inducement to invest." This would have been immensely more valuable than the last paragraph of the summary in which he tries to squeeze out of his analysis a crude economic explanation of the war. By failing to integrate his own research with general economics, the author also quite often gives the impression unintentionally that the features described are peculiar Nazi phenomena, whereas, in fact, they are general features of a changing industrial organization in all countries. The method of "self-financing" as the main source of long-term capital, for instance, is just as prevalent in England, as may be seen from the figures given by Colin Clark in his *National Income and*

Outlay. There may be a peculiar German ideology of the *Unternehmen an sich*, which might partially explain the favor shown to self-financing under the Nazi administration, but if so, it is not fully explained in this book.

Thus the book suffers a little through a lack of comparative standards. It is very tempting, for instance, to compare the German method of financing investment through *Preisfinanzierung*, that is, by permitting prices to be high relative to wage rates, with the Russian system of increasing prices by a turnover tax. In both instances, the method employed to finance new investment is essentially of a fiscal nature; in the German case, however, this fact is veiled by a delegation of such fiscal functions to private entrepreneurs (though these in turn were publicly controlled). By pointing to such likenesses or dissimilarities the author could have thrown a more revealing light on the German system than is shed by the mere accumulation of detailed facts; yet this line of approach has been neglected.

The second flaw in the book concerns the vital question of what Professor Hayek has called the problem of "Who? Whom?" We learn a great deal about controls but nothing about who controls the controllers nor of who the immediate controllers are. It is admitted that more sociological and less economic analysis would have been required to answer this question, but this is only another way of saying that the Nazi system cannot be understood by means of purely economic analysis. As it is, the book gives one the feeling that the author is trying to pull himself up by his own bootstraps. It would be well for readers to preface the study of this book with one like Franz Neumann's *Behemoth*.

Naturally, a book of this scope elicits some criticism also at a more detailed level. For example, Lurie's statistical estimates of the amount of self-financing from hidden reserves seems to fail to take account of the "backlog factor," that is, the degree in which depreciation allowances had not been earned and proper depreciation had been suspended during the preceding depression. Similarly, his rejection of the argument that dividend limitation supported the quotation of Reich loans cannot be fully accepted. It is true, as he points out, that there is nothing in the argument that dividend limitation makes industrial shares any less attractive compared with state securities. What he forgets, however, is that dividend limitation results in the investment of the accumulated cash by corporations and thus supports the capital market. It must also be said that his statements about subsequent wartime developments seem to be limited to conditions during the first

half of the war; the statement, for example, that Germany did not develop an excess profits tax during the war is not true for the second half, except in a very technical sense.

Despite these strictures, I do not wish to minimize the value of Mr. Lurie's work. With all its weaknesses, this is a useful and important book, much above the average.

HANS W. SINGER

United Nations

MILLS, FREDERICK C. *Price-Quantity Interactions in Business Cycles*. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research. 1946. xii & 140 pp. \$1.50.

The primary purpose of this volume is to measure and study the cyclical fluctuations of the prices and quantities of particular commodities as well as the average movements of prices and quantities of certain broad groups of commodities. The book is the second in a series commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and it is particularly appropriate that it should have been published in this connection, for the author has used the well-known technique of business cycle measurement which has been developed at the Bureau over a period of many years.

Like many of the other studies emanating from the National Bureau, Professor Mills's work on prices and quantities represents a summary of a tremendous amount of effort in compiling and averaging economic data; altogether, sixty-four commodities are included in the description of price and quantity movements during business cycles. The time interval for which data are available varies considerably from commodity to commodity, but some of the series go back as far as 1858. For each price series and each quantity series the data are divided into cyclical intervals according to the so-called "reference cycles," which have now become such a standard part of the Bureau's equipment, the dividing points between cycles being the troughs of the cycles. Each cycle is divided into nine stages and the data for a given price or quantity within a particular stage are expressed as percentages of the average value of that price or quantity throughout the particular cycle. Finally, the business cycle relatives for a particular commodity during a given stage—the second stage, for example—are then averaged over all the cycles for which data are available. By means of this procedure, now well known to most economists, a sort of average business cycle pattern is devised for each price series and each quantity series.

One of the primary problems that interests Professor Mills is how the typical cyclical pattern of price for a given commodity is related to the pattern of the physical volume of sales or output for the same commodity. In other words, when the price of a particular commodity rises in the prosperity stages of the cycle, is the corresponding movement of quantity positively or negatively correlated with the price movement? And if the correlation is positive, is the relative change in price greater or smaller than the relative change in quantity? To answer these questions, the author plots the business cycle price relative against the quantity relative for the same stage of the cycle. He then computes what he calls a cyclical "elasticity of quantity" for each commodity, this being a rough measure of the ratio of relative changes in quantity to relative changes in price throughout the typical cycle. Similar charts and similar elasticities are also computed for index numbers of prices and quantities of certain broad commodity groups.

Although the results of these computations are interesting, it cannot be said, on the whole, that they reveal any price-quantity relations not previously known. They serve, rather, to emphasize the well-known fact that most agricultural products have a low quantity elasticity (or high price flexibility) while most products of the metallic or "heavy" industries have a high quantity elasticity (or low price flexibility). Again, the computations confirm the widely-held and well-documented view that raw materials have a higher cyclical price flexibility than highly fabricated commodities. What is perhaps most interesting in Professor Mills's work is not the novelty of his conclusions but the fact that these conclusions, derived from a study of many cycles, agree closely with the conclusions that many economists have reached from a study of the thirties alone. Although little is known about the statistical accuracy of Professor Mills's computations, his results at least suggest that price-quantity interactions observed during the thirties are fairly typical of cyclical price and quantity movements in general.

Following his discussion of price-quantity relations, the author presents a detailed account of cyclical movements in total outlays for various types of goods, using the same method as before to derive a typical cyclical pattern. It seems to me that a considerable part of this discussion of total outlay is unnecessary, since movements in total outlay can be inferred, if not actually measured, from the earlier discussions of prices and quantities.

As in the case of many of the National Bureau publications, this one presents the facts without making any attempt to explain them.

For example, no discussion will be found here of the causes of the substantial differences between one commodity and another in the degree of cyclical price flexibility. We are given additional evidence of the stability or flexibility of certain prices, but nothing is added to our present inadequate knowledge of the reasons for such stability or flexibility. In an earlier review (that of *Measuring Business Cycles* by Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, which appeared in the September 1947 issue of this journal) I criticized this method of "measurement without theory," which is common to much of the business cycle work of the National Bureau. In general, this criticism is also applicable to the present volume. Any search for facts, or for relations between variables, is likely to be self-defeating unless the investigator has at least a rudimentary idea or hunch as to the nature of the system he is describing. While such a theory may be inherent in the National Bureau's work, it has yet to appear in any of their publications. And considering the long period of time during which the Bureau has been conducting its studies, the present reviewer will perhaps be forgiven for expressing at least moderate impatience at the delay in presenting the theory that lies behind the measurements.

LLOYD A. METZLER

University of Chicago

BARTH, HEINRICH. *Philosophie der Erscheinung. Eine Problemgeschichte. Erster Teil: Altertum und Mittelalter*. Basel: Benno Schwabe. 1947. xiv & 390 pp. \$8.40.

The author of this extraordinary book is a professor of philosophy at the University of Basel. He seems to belong among those "existential" philosophers whose thought has taken definite shape under the influence of the work of Martin Heidegger. This is suggested both by his leading point of view and occasionally by his terminology, although the content of the present volume is strictly historical and the author suggests his own views only by implication. At times a reader would be grateful if he had stated them somewhat more explicitly.

This is not a history of philosophy but the history of a problem, and the author makes it clear that he considers other problems no less important than that of *Erscheinung* (for which the English "apparition" is a rather inadequate translation, whereas, for Barth, "phenomenon" bears a somewhat different connotation). On the other hand, his analyses penetrate to such depth and have been carried so far that they open new vistas on almost all the basic problems of ancient and

medieval metaphysics. Moreover, behind the analyses there appears a historical synthesis of striking originality. The volume contains four chapters devoted to ancient philosophy (the presocratics, Plato, Aristotle, neoplatonism), and two dealing with various aspects of scholastic philosophy. Each of these chapters contains a surprising wealth of new and often illuminating interpretations which can be mentioned only summarily. It should be emphasized, however, that throughout his work the author tries to penetrate to the living sources of the written word and to interpret even the remotest piece of doxographic tradition as a genuine effort to envisage truth.

In all ages, metaphysics has had to account in some way for the world as it appears, that is, *Erscheinungen*. Yet it is a well-known fact that philosophers, while interpreting the meaning of *Erscheinung*, have as a rule gone beyond it and judged it with their attention fixed on other modes of being. In the history of Western philosophy the most influential force which prevented an unprejudiced interpretation of *Erscheinung* was the predominance of the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of the *eidos*. The author places primary emphasis on Aristotle's part in the analysis of this concept, although he offers new evidence for the closer relationship between the thought of the two thinkers, and particularly for the view that Aristotle as well as Plato taught a separate existence (*chorismos*) of the *eidos*. As a result of Aristotle's influence on practically all subsequent philosophers up to the end of the Middle Ages, ancient and medieval ontology remained prejudiced in that it assumed the existence of a certain canon of being. This canon meant a kind of formal excellence, and was often considered an existing ("ontic") reality, with metaphysical priority before *Erscheinung*. Even where the latter assumption was excluded, the ontological value of *Erscheinung* was made dependent upon the degree in which it approached the "eidetic" canon.

Barth's demonstration of the persisting power of this tradition is certainly the most impressive result of his investigations. He is especially convincing in pointing out the influence of this tradition on the Arabian and Christian scholastics, whom their monotheistic faith caused to develop theories which demanded different ontological foundations. Their vigorous distinction between essence and existence, and their entirely new interpretation of the latter concept, seemed to open the way for an analysis of being which excelled that of the Greeks. Not before the rise of scholasticism had *Erscheinung* competed so closely for positive ontological recognition. But up to the rise of late medieval nominalism (with which the book ends) the

"eidetic" tradition was never given up entirely. The result was various compromises. The author discovers traces of conflicting tendencies even in the work of the greatest summists.

While Barth appears to be successful in proving the unity of the "eidetic" tradition, it looks as though there is no such unity in the history of the interpretation of *Erscheinung*. In the chapter on the neoplatonic philosophy, for instance, he affirms that most of what Plotinus said about *Erscheinung* was negative. Since basic conceptions of the Plotinian philosophy are nevertheless discussed from this point of view, the resulting picture seems to be somewhat distorted.

Occasionally it appears that in order to appraise the author's historical interpretations one must criticize his own philosophical views. He asserts that there is a close relationship between the problem of *Erscheinung* and that of human "existence." Yet the latter problem is discussed only in a few scattered places, notably in the chapter on Plato. The author thinks that Plato's approach remains ambiguous, in spite of certain steps toward a positive analysis, and

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that in the end Plato by-passes the problem of "existence." Plato, he alleges, never makes it clear whether it is really the individual soul that is immortal, but teaches that the soul which contemplates eternal ideas forgets its human individuality. Does this not prove that Plato has no real interest in "existence"? To this reviewer it seems likely that Barth's own interpretation of "existence" prevents him from recognizing the meaning of the Platonic analysis. Otherwise he might have arrived at a very different result, especially if he had taken full account of the dialogical setting of the Platonic philosophy. It might have appeared then that Plato's turn toward the *eidos* springs from his attempt to interpret those "existential" possibilities which were awakened in him through his love for the individual Socrates.

This criticism does not deny the value of many pertinent remarks about Plato's theory of ideas and his cosmology. Nor can it lower our great expectations for the continuation of this important work.

ERNST MORITZ MANASSE

North Carolina College (Durham)

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